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The ripples of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) had a far-reaching effect that touched
Spanish speaking people outside of Spain. In the United States, Hispanic communities –which
encompassed Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, Spaniards, and others— were directly involved
in anti-isolationist activities during the Spanish Civil War. Hispanics mobilized efforts to aid the
Spanish Loyalists, they held demonstrations against the German and Italian intervention, they
lobbied the United States government to lift the arms embargo on Spain, and some traveled to
Spain to fight in the International Brigades. This paper examines how the Spanish Civil War
affected the diverse Hispanic communities of Tampa, New York, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco.
Terminology, the words Hispanic and Latino in this paper refer to any citizen or resident
of the United States, of any racial background and religion, with ancestry linked to Spain or any
Spanish speaking country of the Americas. Chapter one focuses on the diverse “Latin” and
“Hispano” communities of Tampa and New York and their efforts to mobilize aid for the
Spanish Loyalists and the unique effect the war had on the Spanish immigrant community.
Chapter two examines the Mexican population of Los Angeles and San Francisco and how labor
unions mobilized the Hispanic community to aid the Spanish Republic and the response from
iii

Pacific Coast maritime workers to the war. Lastly, chapter three centers on the conservative
Mexican exiled press in the Southwestern United States and their response to the Spanish Civil
War.
Against the backdrop of the Spanish Civil War, this paper deals with issues regarding
ethnicity, class, gender, and identity. It discusses racism towards Hispanics during the early days
of labor activism. It examines ways in which labor unions used the conflict in Spain to rally
support from their members to raise funds for relief aid. It looks at how Hispanics fought against
American isolationism in the face of the growing threat of fascism abroad.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of Hispanics in the United States as
actors involved in global events during American isolationism. Hispanics communities played an
active part in anti-isolationist and relief aid movement for Spain throughout the Spanish Civil
War. After the conflict, they turned their efforts to aid the thousands of Spanish refugees
crammed into internment camps in France and joined the nation in the mobilizing for World War
II.
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INTRODUCTION

In April 1931, the Second Spanish Republic was proclaimed, which followed a landslide
victory in the municipal elections that forced the abdication of King Alfonso XIII, celebrations
erupted not only in Spain but also across Spanish communities in the United States. In the
Spanish mutual societies of Ybor City and West Tampa, portraits of the king were unhung, and
the tricolor flag of the new Republic raised as the community celebrated the arrival of democracy
in Spain. Many among the Spanish community in Tampa hoped that the new Republic would
address the conditions that had forced them to emigrate to the United States.
The Republic government promised to institute land reform, and decrease the political
power of the Church, military, and aristocracy. The Republic implemented universal education
and constructed non-religious schools throughout the country. The Constitution of 1931
established freedom of speech, freedom of association, and women’s suffrage, while stripping
the nobility of legal privileges and decreasing the power of the Church.1 However, the victory of
the Frente Popular (a coalition of left-wing parties) in the 1936 elections over the Confederación
Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA) created panic among the defeated right who lost hope
of regaining power. Traditionalists within the army sought a military solution and prepared a

1

Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish republic and the Civil War 1931-1939 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1967), 45-60.
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coup under the direction of General Emilio Mola. The plan was to force the transfer of power by
mobilizing the Army in the Peninsula and Africa. However, the uprising of July 17, 1936, failed
after encountering unexpected resistance from the Spanish civilian population. The military coup
sparked a civil war that divided Spain into Nationalist and Loyalist Republican zones. The Nazi
German and Italian intervention on the side of the Nationalists turned the conflict into a battle
between democracy and fascism.2
For many American liberals in the United States, the war in Spain was yet another
menacing example of the spreading threat of fascism across Europe. The unexpected resistance
of the Spanish people against the Nationalists raised optimism that Spain could become the
“tomb of fascism.” However, the passage of a joint resolution banning the sale of arms to Spain
in January 1937 by the U.S. Congress dashed the hope of a Nationalist defeat. By May, the
passage of the Neutrality Act of 1937 extended the measure to include the prohibition of U.S.
citizens or businesses from assisting belligerents or traveling to Spain. The United States
government, fearful of foreign entanglement in another European war, decided to follow the lead
of the Non-Intervention Committee in London and remain neutral in the Spanish Civil War. The
U.S. embargo to Spain was the first time in history when the United States refused to sell arms to
a legally elected government. This was another example of a string of isolationist U.S.
government policies that followed World War I. Many historians agree that the United States
refusal to provide international leadership during the interwar period significantly contributed to
the worsening of the Great Depression, helped produce conditions that fostered totalitarian

2

Ibid., 190-230.
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fascist regimes, encouraged German and Japanese aggression, and contributed to the scale of
World War II.3
American liberals who sympathized with the Spanish Republic were outraged that the
embargo deprived the legitimate government of Spain the supplies they needed to defend
themselves, even after the headlines of the bombing of Guernica by the Luftwaffe revealed
Germany's support of the Nationalist side.4 They saw the embargo as an illegal action that
infringed on the Spanish government's ability to defend itself and endangered American national
security by fostering Nazi German and Italian aggression. While the U.S. government neglected
to address its international problems and embraced isolationism, the national response to the
Spanish situation was carried out by various private organizations and thousands of American
combat volunteers who rose to fill the void left by the country’s elected leaders. Across the
United States, key organizations of various political persuasion disseminated propaganda,
lobbied Washington, and raised relief aid to the Republic.5 Much has been written on the
American volunteers in Spain and less on the relief aid movement in the United States.6
However, the historiography has not provided significant attention towards Hispanics in the
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See Frank Costigliola, Award Dominion: American Politica, Economic, and Ideational Relations with Europe, 19191933 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Charles P. Kindleberger, World in Depression 1929-1939 (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1973); John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
4
Albany Evening News April 27, 1937; The New York Times April 28, 1937.
5
For a detailed overview of American aid efforts during the Spanish Civil War see Eric R. Smith, American Relief Aid
and the Spanish Civil War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2013).
6
On the historiography of American volunteers in Spain see Robert Rosenstone, Crusade of the Left: The Lincoln
Battalion in the Spanish Civil War (New York: Pegasus, 1969); Arthur Landis, The Abraham Lincoln Brigade (New
York: Citadel Press, 1967); Victor Berch, African Americans in the Spanish Civil War: “This Ain’t Ethiopia but it I’ll
do.” (Boston: GK Hall, 1991); Peter N. Carroll, The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (Sandford: Stanford
University Press, 1994); Peter N. Carroll & James D. Fernandez, Facing Fascism: New York and the Spanish Civil War
(New York: New York University Press, 2007); Adam Hoshschild, Spain in our Hearts: Americans in the Spanish Civil
War, 1936-1939 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016); On the historiography of the American relief aid see
Guttmann Allen, The Wound in the Heart: America and the Spanish Civil War (New York: Free Press of Glencoe,
1962); Smith, 2013.
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United States involved in the American relief aid for Spain movement or among the international
volunteers. In Crusade of the Left, historian Robert Rosenstone set out to understand the average
American volunteer in Spain. He incorrectly concluded that of the various ethnic groups of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade, “the only group that seem to have been missing from its ranks were
Mexican Americans.”7 In more recent works, neither Peter N. Carroll’s The Odyssey of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade or Adam Hoshschild’s Spain in our Hearts provide significant study
on the involvement of Hispanic Americans during the Spanish Civil War.
This paper examines how the diverse Hispanic communities of Tampa, New York, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco responded to the Spanish Civil War. Although isolationism remained
strong in American society during the interwar period, the effort to aid Spain and the call to lift
the U.S. arms embargo demonstrated the beginning of American internationalism that followed
in the post-World War II era.8 Hispanic Americans were a part of this internationalist trend. They
joined like-minded citizens across the country in opposing non-interventionist government
policies, which they believed endangered national security. They stood up to defend American
democratic values in the face of totalitarianism even though they were often characterized as
being un-American. Hispanic communities mobilized to aid the Spanish Loyalists, they held
demonstrations against the German and Italian intervention, they lobbied the United States
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Rosenstone, 109.
The majority of the American public supported isolationism during the 1930s. In 1937 an opinion poll concluded
that 70 percent of Americans felt that entering World War I was a mistake. Another poll in 1937, found 56 percent
of Americans supported staying out of another world war. By the end of 1940, 60 percent of Americans favored
helping England in the war against Germany even if it risked the U.S. getting involved in war. After the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, only 20 percent of Americans believed that the U.S. involvement in World War I was a
mistake. See Jeffrey W. Legro, “Whence American Internationalism,” International Organization 54, 2 (Spring,
2000): 273-274.
8
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government to lift the arms embargo on Spain, and some traveled to Spain to fight in the
International Brigades.
The first chapter of this paper focuses on the Spanish immigrant communities of Tampa
and New York. Many were first and second-generation Spanish immigrants with ties to Spain.
For them, the Spanish Civil War had direct consequences on their lives and identities. They
organized around established mutual aid societies and clubs to form aid committees separate
from the mainstream American relief effort. They collected a disproportion amount of aid for
their population size and lobbied Washington to lift the embargo. The outcome of the war
facilitated the transformation of their identity from immigrant to American.9
The second chapter concentrates on Mexican-American and Mexican immigrant workers
in Los Angeles and San Francisco. The Spanish Civil War came shortly after the worst years of
the U.S. government's repatriation campaign that deported large numbers of both immigrants and
citizens of Mexican descent during the Great Depression. The trauma of repatriation solidified
their identity as Americans and fueled their demand for the recognition of their rights as citizens.
Their participation in the American relief movement for Spain came at a time when they were
becoming more active in labor militancy and the struggle for civil rights. Their involvement was
a rejection of U.S. isolationist policies that they believed endangered national security. They
defied false characterizations of being un-American and demonstrated their commitment to
democracy by standing firmly against totalitarianism during the interwar period and World War
II.

9

For a broader study on Spanish immigrants in the United States, see Ana Maria Varela-Lago, “Conquerors,
Immigrants, Exiles: The Spanish Diaspora in the United States (1848-1948),” PhD Thesis (University of California:
San Diego, 2008).
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The third chapter looks at the unique position of the Mexican exiled press in the
American southwest. They represented the conservative exiled elite from the Mexican revolution
and published articles that criticized the government policies of Mexican President Lazaro
Cardenas and his administration’s support for the Spanish Republic. In contrast to the Spanish
language press in New York and Tampa, the Mexican exiled press supported the Spanish
Nationalists and regularly published pro-fascist propaganda during the Spanish Civil War.
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CHAPTER 1.
THE HISPANIC COMMUNITIES OF TAMPA AND NEW YORK DURING THE
SPANISH CIVIL WAR

The Latin Community of Tampa
In the nineteenth century, the Cuban struggle for independence from Spain created a
wave of immigration into the United States. Between 1868 and 1878, hundreds of tobacco
factory owners and workers relocated their manufacturing plants into the Florida Keys to escape
the destruction of the Ten Years War. By the end of the century, Florida’s cigar factories
expanded into Ybor and Tampa, which served as a magnet for Cuban and Spanish migrants
escaping economic deprivation. In 1892 the American consul-general to Cuba, Ramon Williams,
testified before a congressional committee that the Cuban people “look upon Florida as so much
a part of their own country,” and an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 people passed back and forth
between Cuba and the United States annually.10
The fight over Cuban independence created an environment ripe for radicalism. By the
1870s, Cuba had become home to anarchists and socialists who labored in support of

10

Quoted in Gary Ross Mormino and George E. Pozzetta, The Immigrant World of Ybor City Italians and their
Latin Neighbors in Tamp, 1885-1985 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 76.
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the working class. Many of these extremists were Spanish émigrés who viewed the conflict as an
international and anti-imperialist conflict.11 In the tobacco factories, the custom of la lectura
assisted the spread of Anarchist ideas throughout the Cuban working class. The practice of la
lectura, which revolved around hired readers, los lectores, that read to the factory workers during
the work day, developed around the mid-nineteenth century. Factory owners allowed the practice
so long as the workers collectively paid the lecturer and managed the selection of readings. La
lectura consisted of a recitation of the daily newspapers, which included foreign news cables,
national news, and sports, followed by a variety of literary works.12 The recitation of antiimperialist newspapers and writings instilled revolutionary ideas on the factory floors and
encouraged workers to demand societal changes. The Spanish colonial government soon became
besieged by demands to abolish slavery, improved working conditions, increased access to
foreign trade markets, and finally independence. The prominence of la lectura and its association
with workers cause caused it to become a political symbol of the revolutionary cause, and los
lectores became targets of assassinations by Spanish loyalists.13
The custom of la lectura was one of the many cultural practices that Cuban migrants
brought with them to the tobacco factories in the United States. By 1900, Tampa and Ybor City
surpassed Key West in both production and immigrant population, which included Italians after
1890. La lectura served as a bridge between the Cuban, Spanish, and Italian immigrant
populations, which created a community of ideas. Spanish became the lingua franca among the
three immigrant groups which came together to form a Latin community. Debates over concepts
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Ibid., 80.
George E. Pozzetta and Gary R. Mormino, “The Reader and the Worker: ‘Los Lectores’ and the Culture of
Cigarmaking in Cuba and Florida,” International Labor and Working-Class History 54, Fall, 1998), 3.
13
Ibid., 5.
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of anarchism, socialism, syndicalism, and capitalism occurred in the factory workrooms, labor
halls, and coffeehouses within the Latin community. Various Spanish language newspapers
circulated in Tampa, which included Dario de la Marina (from Havana) and Tierra y Libertad (a
Barcelona anarchist publication). Italian language anarchist newspapers in Tampa, such as La
Voce dello Schiavo and L’Alba Sociale, were widely read among the Italian immigrant
community working in the factories. Spanish and Italian editions of revolutionary propagandists,
such as Leo Tolstoy, Karl Marx, Enrico Malatesta, Luigi Galleani, and Peter Kropotkin, lined the
shelves of the mutual aid society libraries in Ybor. By the turn of the century, the influence of
anarchist and socialist groups among the working class played a role in uniting the worker strikes
of 1901 and 1910 which paralyzed Tampa’s cigar industry. 14
During the 1890s, Ybor City became a hotbed for the Cuba Libre movement.
Revolutionaries such as Ramon Rivero y Rivero, Jose Dolores Poyo, and Fernando Figuerado,
read stories of the French Revolution and Simon Bolivar to workers, organized political cells and
edited El Yara and La Contienda newspapers. In the build-up to the Cuban War of
Independence, Jose Marti left New York and toured Ybor City, West Tampa, and Key West
delivering a series of speeches to large crowds. In May 1893, Marti was greeted by “thousands of
enthusiastic people,” from the Cuban community in Key West, of which “eighty to 100 men
stepped out and pledged themselves to fight for Cuban freedom”15 The news of the Cuban
uprising of February 24, 1895, was received with excitement by the Cuban immigrant
community across the United States. In Ybor City, the Cuban flag was waved and unfurled
across every public and private building and residence. Three thousand residents, “wild with

14

Ibid., 6-8.; George E. Pozzetta, “Immigrants and Radicals in Tampa Florida,” The Florida Historical Quarterly
57 (January, 1979) 341-6.
15
The Racine Daily Journal May 03, 1893.
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enthusiasm,” assembled in front of Ybor and Manrara’s factory to cheer and heed political
speeches calling for support from the city’s Cuban community.16
The numerous “Cuba Libre” clubs in Florida and across the country raised funds in
support of the revolutionary effort.17 Cuban women in Tampa played an active role in support of
the revolution, organizing fundraising fiestas, parades, raffles, and clubs. The American military
involvement in the conflict, after the sinking of the USS Main in February 1898, transformed
Cuba’s fight for independence into the Spanish American War. The sentiments of the Cuban
community in Florida wavered from patriotic enthusiasm to the somber realization that one
empire would replace another.18
Following the Spanish defeat, Cubans continued to work for change.19 Many living in
Florida decided to remain rather than return to the crippled economy of their liberated homeland.
The end of the war of independence provided few clear answers, but the revolutionary ideas of
the era remained in Florida’s Latin community after the war.20 In 1903 Sicilian immigrant
Angelo Massari arrived in Florida to discover that “socialism and anarchism were in vogue” in
the Latin community of Ybor City. Like many Italian immigrants working in the cigar factories
of Florida, Massari learned how to “read and write Spanish rather quickly.” He also “attended all

16

The Tampa Tribune February 28, 1895.
The Houston Post September 27, 1897.; The Butte Miner December 15, 1896.; Kansas City Journal Dec 16, 1896;
Buffalo Evening News Dec 15, 1896.
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Gary R. Mormino, “Tampa’s Splendid Little War: Local History and the Cuban War of Independence,” OAH
Magazine of History 12, (Spring, 1998): 38-9.
19
Maria Cristina Garcia, “Hardliners v. ‘Dialogueros’: Cuban Exile Political Groups and United States-Cuban
Policy,” Journal of American Ethnic History 17, (Summer, 1998): 6.
20
Ibid., 41.
17

10

the lectures and debates that the two groups, socialist and anarchist, organized,” which he states
invited “to Tampa, the greatest exponents of the two theories who were living in the North.”21
Between 1886 and 1931, workers continued to seek improved working conditions and
labor strikes erupted periodically in Ybor’s cigar manufacturing industry. Jose Yglesias, an
adolescent during the 1931 strike in Ybor City, mentioned that “wages were bitterly fought for,”
and female workers received equal pay. He described the women as “very militant,” and
mentioned that they were heavily involved in the strikes and would “beat up women scabs” who
continued to work despite the strike.22
By the early 1930s, the Communist Party had made inroads in Ybor City’s working class,
but never commanded significant support. Los lectores read The Daily Worker and Socialist Call
often to factory workers, and distributed leaflets amongst the Latin community. However, the
Great Depression had a devastating effect on the Latin community in Ybor City. Layoffs and
seasonal unemployment weakened the cigar worker's collective strength. And la lectura, which
played a critical role in articulating the issues to the cigar makers involved in strikes, became a
target of the factory owners.23 The prohibition of la lectura by Tampa and Ybor City’s
manufacturers and the arrest of 17 Lectores accused of being “communist agitators,” in
November 1931, ignited a massive worker strike with 7000 workers walking out of the
factories.24 The 1931 strike “was openly radical,” recalled Yglesias. However, the weakened
stance of the workers was no match for the combined strength of the factory owners, the police

21

Angelo Massari, The Wonderful Life of Angelo Massari: An Autobiography (New York: Exposition Press, 1965),
91-92.
22
Studs Terkel, Hard Times: An Oral History of the Great Depression (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 109.
23
Ibid.,111.; Lopez, Armando. Interview by George Pozzetta. Ybor City Oral History Project University of South
Florida. Tampa, April 24, 1980. https://digital.lib.usf.edu/SFS0022549/00001
24
The Tampa Tribune November 28, 1931.
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and the Ku Klux Klan. Racial discrimination was already a serious problem for Ybor’s Latin
community before the strike and racist white Floridians would often refer to any Latin as a
“Cuban nigger.” The magnitude of the strike and the press coverage that it received served to
encourage further racist attacks towards the Latin community from white supremacist groups.
Yglesias mentioned that during the strike, cigar workers often clashed against the KKK and at
times Klansmen would charge into “Labor Temple with guns, and break up meetings.” However,
despite the best efforts of the factory workers, the strikes failed after the police cracked down on
the workers and arrested several of the strike leaders.25 After the factories reopened, the owners
fired many of the workers who participated in the strike and la lectura ceased to exist in
Florida’s cigar manufacturing industry.26
The Great Depression and the aftermath of the 1931 strike devastated the Latin
community in Florida. The demand for expensive cigars nationwide dropped as consumers
switched to cheaper cigarettes. Cigar makers that remained employed experienced reduced
workweeks as short as “three days.” The specific skills of the cigar makers and the local
economy’s sole focus on tobacco manufacturing limited the opportunities for alternative
employment. Discrimination against Latins inhibited cigar makers from looking for work outside
their community. “We can’t go to some other places like Clearwater, because they’ve got signs,
‘We don’t like Latin people, even dogs,’ ” recalled Armando Lopez. The realities of living deep
in the Jim Crow South during the 1930s meant that straying too far outside the Latin enclave in
Ybor City ran the risk of encountering racial violence. “They used to fight with anyone that gone

25
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The Tampa Tribune December 5, 1931.; Terkel, 109-11.
Terkel, 111.
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over there [Sulphur Springs] if they are Latin people.” However, Ybor’s Latin youth would often
retaliate and go “over there to get [into] fights, too.” 27
Despite the despair of the economic environment, the news of the Spanish army revolt in
Spain and Morocco, on July 17, 1936, reinvigorated the revolutionary furor of the Latin
community in Florida once again. The cry of No Pasaran! during the Spanish Civil War
energized Ybor City much as the cause of Cuba Libre had done decades before during the Cuban
War of Independence. By the 1930s, the Latin community in West Tampa and Ybor City
numbered at 30,000, with 8,000 native Spaniards mostly from Asturias. Ybor City constituted
the second-largest pro-Republican Spanish speaking population in the United States. The
Spanish community working in Florida’s cigar industry were first and second-generation with
direct family ties to Spain during the war.28
The response to the Spanish Civil War from the Latin community of West Tampa and
Ybor City revolved around the well-established mutual aid societies and social clubs. During the
1880s and 1890s, Tampa’s immigrants formed mutual aid clubs to provide basic medical care for
members in exchange for weekly dues. Also, the clubs offered social activities, gymnasiums,
concerts, and theatrical performances. Generally, the clubs were founded by and opened to
specific ethnic groups: The Italian Club for Italians, El Centro Español and El Centro Asturiano
for Spaniards, and La Union Marti-Maceo for Afro-Cubans, Circulo Cubano for white male
Cubans, and La Obrera de La Independencia for white female Cubans. Racism was generally not
a major issue among the Latin community. Black and white Cuban cigar makers worked side by
side, and Latin families often had a wide-ranging spectrum of skin tones. However, Florida’s

27
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Armando Lopez Interview.
Mormino and Pozzetta, 216.
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segregation laws prohibited black and white-skinned Latins from public socialization, which lead
to the creation of multiple Cuban clubs. 29 However, most of the Cuban clubs were founded on
Marti’s revolutionary principles and did not discriminate against non-Cubans who wished to
join. “Even if you are a China[ese], you can belong to the Circulo Cubano, or any others,” only
the club president had to be Cuban, recalled Mr. Lopez.30
Despite the national designation of the clubs, Tampa’s Latin community joined together
and regularly observed social interactions between the mutual societies. The third and longestserving president of the Italian Club, Philip Licata, taught a whole generation of Ybor City
children Spanish and Italian as a school teacher.31 During the weekends, the Latin Clubs would
regularly compete against each other in the Inter-social League. “About five or six teams there
that would play [base]ball on Sundays and they were very competitive,” recalled Augustine
“Marty” Martinez. Every Sunday at Cuscaden Park, a crowd of “about a thousand people” from
the Latin Clubs would gather to play “ball, basketball, volleyball, football, baseball, softball,” to
see which club team “would be the champion.”32 Also, Ybor’s Latin youth would frequent the
dances from the various clubs. “It was a perfect setup for a young boy because you know, you
could go there—you didn’t have to take a date, you could go there by yourself, and you could
always find some girls there that were chaperoned,” recalled Al Lopez. Along with his Spanish

29

Nancy Raquel Mirabal, “The Afro-Cuban Community in Ybor City and Tampa, 1886-1910,” OAH Magazine of
History 7 (Summer, 1993), 19-21.
30
Armando Lopez Interview.
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Italiano, Mary. Interview by Gary Mormino. Ybor City Oral History Project University of South Florida. Tampa,
April 20, 1978. https://digital.lib.usf.edu/SFS0022541/00001
32

Martinez, “Marty” Augustine. Interview by Catherine Cottle. Ybor City Oral History Project University of South
Florida. Tampa, August 16, 2008. https://digital.lib.usf.edu/SFS0022538/00001
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family, he was a member of the Centro Asturiano, but he preferred to go to the Italian Club
dances, which he attended “quite a lot as a young boy.”33
From the start of the Spanish Civil War, the Latin community response to the conflict
was immediate. A week after the Nationalist uprising up to 150 members of the Tampa
community, with Spanish, Italian, Cuban, and Brazilian backgrounds, offered themselves as
volunteers to the Spanish Republican Army. However, the Spanish consul in Tampa, Paul
Ubarri, announced that the Spanish government was unable to accommodate their request and
had to turn down their offer of service. Yet the communitys enthusiasm did not faulter and La
Gaceta newspaper, the most prominent paper of the Latin community (and published in three
languages), declared that “if it were possible to go to Spain in a few hours, hundreds from Tampa
would take up arms in defense of the Popular Front.” A few weeks later, leading members of the
various mutual aid societies organized and founded the Comité Popular Democrático de Socorro
a España de Tampa (the Tampa Popular Democratic Committee to Aid Spain) in August 1936.
The Comité became the center of Ybor City’s aid effort and raised $1,400 in relief aid for the
Spanish Loyalists in the first week. 34
Despite the economic depression, the Latin community donated enough relief aid to rival
any major city. During the war, the Comité managed to raise an estimated $150,000 in donations
through various fundraisers, picnics, sports games, and donation drives. In comparison, Tampa’s
Latin community raised more aid than any other pro-Loyalist community in the United States
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Al Lopez. Interview by Gary Mormino. August 16, 2008. Tampa, Florida. Ybor City Oral History Project University
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outside of New York City.35 Aida Azpeitia noted that this was accomplished by people who were
under the worst economic conditions of their time. “These people that were giving the money
weren’t making much money themselves,” Azpeitia stated. “They were barely making a living.”
Yet, enthusiasm was strong enough that almost everyone in the community rallied together to
raise money for the Loyalists. As Alicia Menendez stated, “all the clubs here in Tampa started to
help. They started to have different kinds of benefits, plays that they put on, and picnics.”36
Every month the Comité sent $5,000 in donations, medical supplies, food, and clothing. In
September 1937 a picnic that drew over 5,000 people collected enough donations to purchase
four ambulances for the Spanish Red Cross. In December 1938 alone, the Latin community
shipped 6,400,000 cigarettes, along with 1,600 cases of condensed milk and 2,000 pounds of
clothing to Spain.37
Initially, the Comité sent monetary donations to Spain through the Spanish embassy.
After realizing this violated U.S. neutrality laws, the organization disassociated with the Spanish
government and worked with the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy and the
Medical Bureau of the American Friend of Spanish Democracy to transport the collected aid.38
However, according to historian Eric R. Smith previous racial assumptions kept Tampa’s aid
efforts estranged from the mainstream American relief aid movement. After all, Tampa’s Latin
community was only a few years removed from severe anti-Catholic prejudice and faced some of
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the worst racial violence in the United States. Allen Guttmann identified that pro-Loyalists
writing and art displayed Spain as a primitive land of Spanish peasants overrun by the modern
European military machine. For example, the American pro-Loyalists film, The Spanish Earth,
displayed an image of primitivism in Spain by invoking nature in its title and focusing on peasant
communities.39
The women of the Latin community of West Tampa and Ybor City played a prominent
role in the efforts to support the Republic of Spain. A few weeks after the formation of the
Comité, the women formed their own called Las Mujeres Antifacistas de Tampa. They became
prominent fixtures among the demonstrators demanding the lifting of the embargo and collected
thousands of goods for Spain. Latin women formed sewing groups and prepared clothing for
shipment. By the end of the war, they had sent more than twenty tons of clothing and thousands
of cans of milk to Spain.40 In May 1937, in response to the bombing in Guernica by the Nazi
Condor Legion, 5,000 women and children marched from Ybor City to West Tampa in protest.
They also collected enough signatures petitioning the “ruthless killing of women and children by
Franco’s forces,” that the Mayor of Tampa was forced to respond.41
Latin women were also politically active. They joined men and women from across the
country in writing letters to their representatives in Washington to lift the arms embargo and
repeal the neutrality law. In April 1938, Tampa’s Latin women joined over a thousand other
Spanish-American women on a march to Washington to request that the State Department lift the
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U.S. embargo to Spain.42 They lead efforts to boycott goods from Germany, Italy, Japan, and
areas of Spain under Nationalist control. In protest of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, one
Latin woman, Soledad Acebal, organized women from the cigar factory and led the effort to
boycott Japanese silk stockings in Tampa through to the end of World War II.43
The children of the Latin community were also involved in fundraising activities. Several
children found ways to raise money for Spain. Amalia Owens recalled, “The kids all used to get
together. We used to collect newspapers and we used to collect the foil (lead foil wrappers from
cigarette packs),” which they melted to make and sell “sinkers for fishing.” A childhood friend
of Amalia even “stripped his mother’s lemon tree,” and sold lemonade to raise money for
Spain.44 Melba Pullara remembered she used to sell churros around Tampa and make “anywhere
from a nickel to a dollar.”45 During the election of 1938, Latin women and children took part in
the Labor Day parade that drew 10,000 marchers. Children, dressed in the Spanish miliciano
(militiamen) uniform and holding American flags, marched alongside their parents to call for a
third term for President Roosevelt. Their banners read: “American children protest murder of
mothers and children in Spain and China,” “Help Democracy Defeat Fascism,” and “Support
New Deal-Defeat Fascism.”46
For the Spanish immigrant families in Ybor City and West Tampa, the war in Spain had
direct consequences on their lives. Among the first and second-generation Spanish immigrants in
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Tampa, many had relatives in Spain who had been affected or had become victims of the war.
Such as Aida, whose uncle in Spain had fought in the Republican Army before being captured
and sent to a prisoner of war camp. The day before his scheduled execution, he escaped and fled
to his grandmother’s house in Asturias. While hiding in the woods, his grandmother “would fix
him food that she didn’t have…and walk the woods looking for him.” Not long after, the
“fascists caught her.” But, instead of being imprisoned, a young man, “un Fascista,” saved her
life. After the war, the family realized that the man that spared their grandmother and uncle was
the nephew of one of their neighbors in Tampa.47
The full mobilization of the Latin community, through the collaboration of the mutual
societies, proved their commitment to defend democracy against totalitarianism. However,
despite their monumental effort in raising aid and awareness, for many cigar makers, the
economic depression in Ybor City became too much to handle. “People began to go off to New
York to look for jobs,” recalled Yglesias, including almost all his family by 1937. During the
1930s, so many from the Latin community had moved to the city that “in any cafeteria, in the
kitchen, the busboys, the dishwashers, you were bound to find at least two from Ybor City.” In
New York, the Latin community remained together and formed the Club Tampa. “People would
show up from Tampa, and you’d put them up,” Yglesias recollected. The economic migration
north from Ybor City and West Tampa’s Latin community to New York City formed a strong
relationship between the two Spanish speaking communities, which had begun decades earlier. 48
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The Hispanos of New York
During the build-up to the Cuban War of Independence, New York City became the
center of revolutionary planning and home to the leaders of the rebellion including José Martí,
Máximo Gómez, and Antonio Maceo. From 1880 to 1895, José Marti lived in New York while
in exile. He continued to advocate for Cuban freedom in numerous speeches and regularly
published pro-independence articles in both American and Spanish language newspapers. In
April 1892, Marti was able to forge unity among the various differing revolutionary factions to
create the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary Party), which united as many
different blocs as possible into one group.49
Two years earlier in Tampa, Marti had made it clear in a speech that all Cubans would
participate in the revolution regardless of color. Among his greatest accomplishments in the
formation of the party was standing firm on racial equality without yielding to those who called
for black subordination in the revolutionary movement. In an article in El Partido Liberal, Marti
tried to dispel racism stating, “there is no racial hatred, because there are no races…the soul,
equal and eternal, emanates from bodies that are diverse in form and color. Anyone who
promotes and disseminates opposition or hatred among races is committing a sin against
humanity.”50 During the planning, Marti had labored to enlist Antonio Maceo into a leadership
position in the revolution. Marti recognized that Maceo’s participation in the revolution would
prove vital in unifying all Cubans to the cause. A hero of the Ten Years’ War with mixed
African and Spanish ancestry, Maceo prominence among the revolutionary leadership would not
only bring his masterful military knowledge into the rebellion but also serve as a symbol for
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national integration of all Cubans regardless of skin color. Mateo did join the revolution, in part
due to Marti’s persistence, and served as the second in command of the Cuban Army of
Independence.51
However, Marti was in desperate need of financial support. During the planning phase, he
made several trips to Tampa, Ybor City, and Key West to garner financial support from the
Tobacco workers who donated generously. In the end, despite sophisticated planning and
impassionate speeches, the fate of the revolution completely depended on the donations from the
cigar makers. If they had not supported his vision of Cuban independence, Marti would have
spent the remainder of his life writing poetry and articles for newspapers in New York. In
November 1891, Marti delivered two influential speeches in Tampa that elevated his popularity
among the pro-Cuban independence sympathizers in Florida. In Tampa, while meeting with the
leaders of the Cuban Patriotic League, Marti wrote the Tampa Resolutions and the bases of the
Partido Revolucionario Cubano. Then in January the following year in Ybor City, he drafted the
general organizing principles of the Partido Revolucionario before its founding in New York a
few months later.52
On January 29, 1895, in New York, a few weeks after the failed Fernandina Plan, Marti
and his conspirators, gave the order for a massive uprising in Cuba. On February 24, fighting
erupted in several locations on the island. By April, Marti returned to Cuba after sixteen years in
exile to join the fighting where he died in the Battle of Dos Rios in May.53 The popularity of the
revolt in Cuba was not only a result of Marti and his revolutionary conspirators' efforts but also a
product of the disintegration of the Cuban economy. In 1884, the United States imported 85
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percent of everything produced in Cuba, including 94 percent of the colony’s sugar and
molasses. President Benjamin Harris had sought to keep tariffs on Cuban sugar low during his
administration. However, the Panic of 1893 forced the U.S. Congress to increase tariffs on
Cuban goods to 40 percent, collapsing the trade between the two nations. The blow to the Cuban
economy moved unemployed citizens to side with the rebellion in the hope of a better future as
an independent nation.54
Although Marti sought American popular support for the Cuban War of Independence, he
understood that U.S. military intervention ran the risk of replacing one colonial ruler with
another. In 1889, Marti warned Latin America that the Pan-American Congress represented an
imperialistic move by the United States to dominate the southern half of the continent politically
and economically.55 The day before Marti died, he wrote an unfinished letter declaring his “duty
of preventing the United States from spreading through the Antilles as Cuba gains its
independence,” and preventing further “annexing [of] our American nations to the brutal and
turbulent North which despises them… I have lived in the monster, and I know its entrails…”56
Despite Marti’s efforts, the result of the Spanish-American War in 1898 expanded the
United States' prominence as an imperialist power. Technically, Cuba was an independent nation
after the war. Though, the United States retained significant influence over Cuba. And the former
Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam became U.S. territories. However,
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the outcome of the Spanish-American war became a milestone in the migration of Spanish
speakers in the United States from Cuba and Puerto Rico.57
In 1938 New York City was home to 200,000 Hispanics and the largest pro-Republican
Spanish speaking population in the United States. Puerto Ricans and Cubans accounted for the
two largest Spanish speaking groups accompanied by 20,000 peninsular Spaniards. However,
from the earliest days of the Spanish conflict, New York’s response was organized by a
collaboration between a panorama of diversity. Anarchists, socialists, communists, liberals,
workers, and intellectuals of white, Jewish, Italian, Hispanic, Asian, and African American
backgrounds joined the campaign to aid the Spanish Republic.58
In the United States, no other city outmatched New York in overall material and political
support for the Loyalists. The city functioned as the central hub for most pro-Republican Spanish
Civil War activism and subversive activities. Almost all major newspapers, magazines, and radio
programs in New York supported the Republican effort of Spain. The fascist aggression towards
the democratically elected government in Spain generated unprecedented cooperation between
humanitarian organizations and leftist groups in the city.59The headquarters of the Friends of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, and the Communist Party
of the United States were all located in New York. Also, all the major relief aid organizations
assisting the Republic resided in the city. Such as the American Friends for Spanish Democracy,
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Trade Union Red Cross for Spain, the American Medical Bureau, the North American
Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, and numerous smaller humanitarian organizations. 60
New York’s working class were the most active supporters of the Spanish Republic. The
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU), one of the largest labor unions in the
United States and first to have primarily female membership, were among the most successful in
gathering aid and raised thousands of dollars for medical supplies and clothing for the Spanish
loyalists.61 Their fundraising efforts revolved around community events. For instance, in
February 1937, the ILGWU Local 22 and Local 19 women played a fundraising game of
basketball in the Hippodrome in Manhattan. 62 A few weeks later, the ILGWU soccer squad
played in a preliminaries match at Hawthorne Field along with the Centro Asturiano, Hatikvoh,
and Hakoah teams to raise funds to purchase medical supplies for Spain.63 By spring, in what
was described as “the biggest May Day parade in the city’s history,” 15,000 members of the
ILGWU marched alongside more than a quarter-million other paraders under showers of confetti
towards union square singing the “International” and chanting “Hands off Spain! Hands off
Spain!”64
Workers also struck back against Franco’s supply lines. In September 1938, New Yorkers
picketed outside the Norwegian consulate after Baltimore seamen walked off the Norwegian
freighter Titanian, which they believed was carrying military supplies to Franco. The ship,
loaded with “6,000 tons of nitrates and phosphates” used in military production, was destined for
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the Nationalist controlled port of Bilbao. The workers strike alerted the FBI, which began an
investigation to verify if the ship violated the U.S. neutrality law. However, the vessel slipped
out of the Baltimore harbor with scab labor before federal authorities could intervene. A few
days later, the Brooklyn based Scandinavian Seamen’s Club of America struck the S.S. Gudvor,
which was also carrying military supplies to the Spanish Nationalists. The United States
Marshals placed the Gudvor under their custody after the workers demanded their wages and
transportation home in Federal Court.65 Maritime workers across the country also protested in
other strikes in Baltimore, Port Arthur, Norfolk, and San Francisco.66
After unions, the most active groups to support the Spanish Republic were the various
ethnic communities in the city, which included African-Americans, Italian-Americans, GermanAmericans, and Spanish-speakers. According to Young Communist Party League organizer and
member of the NAACP, Howard Johnson, around 75 percent of black cultural figures had Party
membership or contact with the Party during the 1930s. The involvement of the Communist
Party USA in defense of the Scottsboro Boys trial in Alabama in 1932, and the Party’s stance on
racial justice and labor rights attracted several black intellectuals from Harlem into the Party. In
1935, African Americans in Harlem organized support of Ethiopia’s war effort following the
unprovoked invasion by fascist Italy. Relief aid was collected and sent through United Aid for
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Ethiopia, which continued to support the Ethiopian government in exile after the Italian
victory.67
During the Spanish Civil War, Benito Mussolini’s involvement in Spain and association
with Franco endeared the Spanish Republic’s fight to the black community. In 1937, the
Communist Party adopted the slogan “Ethiopia’s fate is at stake on the battlefields of Spain” and
urged material aid collected for Ethiopia to be sent to Spain. At first, the connection was not
universally accepted within the black community and provoked criticism from black nationalist
leaders. However, many black intellectuals and artists adopted this initiative. Harlem poet
Langston Hughes sent his support to the American Writers and Artists' efforts in donating
ambulances. Harlem churches and community organizations sponsored rallies in support of the
Loyalist cause. Black medical workers from Harlem hospitals raised funds to send a fully
equipped ambulance for Spain. Also, two black doctors and a female nurse volunteered in
Spain.68
Among the Spanish-speaking community of New York, Puerto Ricans represented the
fastest-growing group by far, followed by Cubans, Spaniards, Mexicans, and other Latin
American nationalities. However, despite their country of origin, Spanish-speakers in the City
formed a homogeneous community of “Hispanos” and the two Spanish language daily
newspapers, La Voz and La Prensa, reflected this. La Prensa regularly reported on news directed
at a diverse and worldly readership. A single issue would report on the war in Spain, Mexico’s
efforts to support the Republican government, Cuban politics, the Venezuelan economy, German
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intervention, the Soviet Union effort’s to assists the Spanish Loyalists, China’s war effort against
Japan, local sporting events featuring Hispanic players, Latin clubs, and so forth.69
There were four Spanish-speaking districts or barrios in the city during the 1930s: East
Harlem, Washington Heights, the Brooklyn waterfront, and the Manhattan foot of the Brooklyn
Bridge. The city’s Spanish-speaking community had lived in close contact before the 1930s.
However, as James D. Fernandez suggests, the Spanish Civil War and community efforts to
support the Loyalists may well have accelerated the formation of a distinct New York Latino
identity.70 For the city’s Hispanos, the war in Spain was lived with immediacy. Despite being
3,000 miles away from the conflict, news from the frontlines had devastating consequences in
New York’s barrios. Heartbreaking newspaper articles, such as the suicide of a man in Cherry
Street who ended his life after hearing his son in Spain was “recruited by the rebels,” were a
constant reminder of the war’s proximity to the Hispano community.71
Despite the economic devastation of the Great Depression, the Hispano community raised
over two million in cash and material donations during the Spanish Civil War.72 Dozens of aid
organizations, social clubs, mutual aid societies, and workers groups within the Spanish-speaking
community collaborated to support the Spanish Republic. Groups such as, the Club Cubano Julio
Antonio Mella in Washington Heights, the Grupo Antifacista del Bronx, the Frente Popular
Español de Queens, Grupo Salmeron, the International Workers Order Spanish section, the
Tampa Workers Club of New York, The Spanish Benevolent Society La Nation in Little Spain,
and so forth, banded together to form an umbrella organization called the Sociedades Hispanas
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Confederadas de Ayuda a España (SHC). The coordinated collaboration among the many groups
through the SHC made larger events possible, such as the July 19, 1937 rally in Madison Square
Garden attended by over 20,000 supporters.73
Both Hispano newspapers often publicized fundraising events among the Spanishspeaking community. For instance, in March 1937, La Prensa advertised several fundraising
events, including a dance held in White Plains to raise funds to purchase an ambulance for the
Spanish Red Cross, organized by the women of the Comité Feminino of the Comité Antifacista
Español.74 Meanwhile, La Voz thanked Hispano vacationers at “Las Villas,” Spanish resorts in
Catskills catering to the city’s Hispanic community, for participation in raffles and organizing a
Spanish fiesta with the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. While also advertising a
farewell party organized by a Manhattan-based Cuban club for a Spanish woman returning to
Spain after fundraising in New York. 75
Within the Hispano community, women of various backgrounds played an active role in
the pro-Loyalist movements in New York. The ILGWU had well over 200,000 members in the
city during the late 1930s, which included many women of various ethnic backgrounds that were
heavily active in labor demonstrations. Members held “Spanish Help Parties” in their homes to
collect donations and they also organized benefit dances in community dancehalls. Women from
the Spanish Workers Club on Madison Avenue and the Galician Center on West 4th Street
gathered to sew and mend clothing for Spain. Together with the Fur Traders Union, the women
of New York sent tens of thousands of garments to Spain. Throughout the city, there were 150
collection points for goods in union halls, mutual aid societies, private homes, and businesses,
73

Poughkeepsie Eagle-News, July 20, 1937.
La Prensa, March 18, 1937.
75
La Voz, July 28, 1938.
74

28

which were then transported to a warehouse in Manhattan before volunteers packed and shipped
them to Spain. 76
One young female activist was Judy Boudon, a Panamanian born immigrant raised in
New York with family ties to Spain. She became active in the antifascist movement and radical
politics in the city against her parents’ wishes, who supported the Loyalist but feared for her
safety. During the war, she worked as an organizer for the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade. Years later, Judy recalled she “would go into the subways with the can,” and “organize
a whole group of Spanish kids in the neighborhood… and got them into the Friends and had
parties and dances,” and other fundraising activities. After the fall of the Spanish Republic, she
joined the Communist Party, stating she “was determined to do all I can do to stop Hitler,” and
felt that the Party “were the only ones that were really trying to stop Hitler.”77
Another young Hispano woman, Pearl, an African-Panamanian from the West Indies and
a descendant of slaves who moved to New York at the age of seventeen, was also involved in
anti-fascist activities in the city. Even though her family was devout Catholics, they remained
liberal-minded and supportive of Pearl’s activism. While working in a textile factory, Pearl was a
club organizer for the Communist Party and was involved in several anti-Hitler and pro-Spanish
democracy demonstrations. Pearl recalled that supporters of the Spanish Republic often
encountered more violence from fascist sympathizers and police than other leftist demonstrators.
“We were pushed around quite a bit, we got hit, we had to run in doorways,” Pearl reflected
years later. “The police on horses would just ride into you, and you had to run for your life, you
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know, and they hit you, one hit me across my back…we had a lot of that…for demonstrations
against the war in Spain.”78
Although the New York based Sociedades Hispanas Confederadas had their membership
concentrated in New York and New Jersey, the organization did collaborate with Comité Popular
Democrático de Socorro a España de Tampa. Both organizations regularly sponsored and
organized theaters, dances, and musical events to raise relief aid. Among the most popular and
successful theoretical performances was the ¡Milicianos al frente!. Ignacio Zugadi, a member of
the Comité Antifacista Español of New York, composed the play in September 1936, along with
fellow member Jose Castilla who wrote the prologue and epilogue. ¡Milicianos al frente!
premiered at the Ateneo Español that same month in New York with considerable success. The
play depicts the heroic tale of two miliciana (militia women) protagonists during the opening
days of the Nationalist uprising who travel to the frontline in defense of Madrid. In the play, the
women transcend their traditional gender roles to defend the Republic, which is also portrayed in
a feminine light as La Niña Bonita.79
During the first eight months, milicianas played an important role in the Republican war
effort. Communist, anarchist, POUMist, socialist, and unaffiliated milicianas played a
sophisticated and extensive military role in frontline combat and rearguard action alongside men
equally. However, as the war progressed, the Spanish Republican government sought to diminish
the role of milicianas in the frontline until most of them had been removed from combat in July
1937. Despite the Republican effort to erase the prominence of the milicianas, the Comité
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Antifacista received numerous requests from affiliated organizations to read and produce the
play. Between September 1936 and Spring 1937 ¡Milicianos al frente! was performed in over
fifty venues. In April 1937, Ybor’s El International newspaper celebrated the performance of the
¡Milicianos al frente! at the Centro Obrero and insisted on an encore. The play was performed
numerous times in 1937 through the sponsorship of various pro-Republican organizations in
Ybor including the Comité de Defensa Frente Popular Español (Spanish Popular Front Defense),
the Comité Feminino de Socorro a España (Women’s Relief Committee for Spain), the Seccion
de Damas y la de Recreo de Centro Obrero (Ladies and Recreation Section of the Workers
Center), and the Agrupacion Benefica de Centro Obrero (Benevolent Association of the Workers
Center).80

The Catholic Church in Tampa and New York
Among American Catholics, the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic and exile
of King Alfonso XIII, after the municipal elections of 1931, created confusion. Some were
supportive of democratic elections after the tumultuous dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera.
While others were fearful of the fate of the Catholic Church in Spain. However, American
Catholics had little knowledge of Spain’s unpleasant history with the clergy or the plight of its
masses and were ready to accept the simplistic reports of the Catholic press.81 A few days after
the Nationalist uprising in Spain, Father Francis X. Talbot called a meeting in Manhattan with
the city’s Catholic journalists to determine a common editorial position on Spain. Among those
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in attendance at the meeting were members of the Nationalist junta. For Talbot, the war was a
fight against the anti-Christian propaganda and practices of the Loyalist government in Spain,”
composed of “Communists, anarchists, syndicalists, and atheistic groups.”82
Anti-Communist and pro-Franco Catholic publications in New York regularly spread
fascist propaganda and misinformation about the situation in Spain. For instance, The Brookland
Tablet, edited by staunch anti-communist Patrick F. Scanlan, frequently published anti-Semitic
and pro-Franco articles. The Tablet described the Spanish Republican government as, “the
successful criminal conspiracy of a little knot of Jewish, Masonic, Socialist and Bolshevik
conspirators; it is tyranny by force and fraud.”83 The Tablet also raised relief aid for Nationalists
Spain and reported over $40,000 in collected donations for Spanish Relief Fund throughout the
war. The Tablet also collected $3,000 to purchase milk for the children of Barcelona and ten tons
of religious article for damaged churches in Spain.84
In addition to his support of Franco, Scanlan was a vocal critic of the New Deal and
steadfast supporter of Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s. In 1951, the government of
Francoist Spain presented Scanlan with the Cross of Isabella the Catholic, investing him as the
knight commander.85Another prominent publication, Social Justice, published by Father Charles
Coughlin, also spread fascist propaganda. Coughlin praised the Rome-Berlin axis for “serving
Christendom in a peculiarly important manner,” and for standing as a “firm rampart against
communism.” One article written by Coughlin resembled a speech made by Joseph Goebbels,
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which attacked Jews and Communists.86 However, the Social Justice printed its last issue in 1942
after Attorney General Beverley Biddle called an investigation into the periodical, which he
described as “clearly seditious.”87
While the American Catholic Church was a major source of support for the Nationalist
forces in Spain, their views did not represent the entirety of America’s religious community. The
American Friends of Spanish Democracy (AFSD) was founded in New York by a group of
clergymen and intellectuals under the leadership of Roger Nash Baldwin, a member of the
executive committee, and Bishop Robert L. Paddock, its chairman. They organized public
appeals, petitions, and letters of protest. They distributed information on the situation in Spain to
counteract the effects of fascist propaganda and brought pressure on the President and Congress
of the United States to end the arms embargo against the Spanish Republic. Also, the AFSD
raised funds for medical aid and refugee relief, which were distributed by the North American
Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy.88American protestant groups also condemned the Nazi
onslaught. For example, in Los Angeles, members of the Southern California Methodist
Conference declared the totalitarian states of “Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin,” as the “greatest
menace to the church today,” and applauded “the donations to war relief in Spain and China.”89
However, American supporters of the Nationalists were less numerous and less
successful in fundraising compared to Loyalists sympathizers. The most spectacular event,
organized by the pro-Franco American Committee for Spanish Relief, occurred on March 19,
1937, in Madison Square Garden. Fifteen thousand people attended the pageant show, but
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$25,793 of the $30,753 collected ended up covering administration and advertising costs.90
Within New York’s Hispano community, some did support the Nationalists, particularly
members of the Casa de España. However, their numbers were also insignificant, and their
leaders would often complain that the vast majority of Hispanos in the city were pro-Republican.
One member of the Casa de España, Dr. Ramón Castroviejo, lamented, “we can count the real
supporters of our movement on the fingers of two hands.”91
Church attendance was not central to the Spanish speaking immigrant communities of
New York and Tampa. The experience of religious oppression under the Catholic Church of
Spain was one of the many reasons they decided to emigrate to the United States. Such was the
case for Joe Maldonado’s family, who left Spain for America just before the start of the First
World War. “The reason they left Spain was because in Asturias, in the village they were in, if
they didn’t attend certain masses, their family…had to pay a fine,” Maldonado stated. “As a
matter of fact, they were so upset with the Catholic religion, back then, that when they came to
Tampa, they never set foot in a Catholic church,” he declared.92 In Tampa, the Census of 1930
documented the contrast between club and religious participation. The Census reported that
roughly 0.8 percent of Cubans, 4.7 percent of Italians, and 11.9 percent of Spaniards attended
church. While, 37.1 percent of Cubans, 29.5 percent of Italians, and 54.9 percent of Spaniards
were club members. Though this mainly reflected the men of the community. Among Latin
women, they comprised ninety percent of church attendance in Tampa.93 However, this changed
after Father John J. Hosey of Our Lady of Perpetual Help in Ybor city and Father Write in West
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Tampa praised General Franco during their sermons and asked for donations for the Nationalist
victims. Latin mothers responded by removing their children from Catholic schools and
boycotting the church in protest.94
However, the rejection of the Catholic church did not mean the rejection of religion.
Hispanos and Latins instead worshiped and prayed at home. Maldonado mentioned that his
parents were of “the belief that to believe in God, you don’t have to necessarily attend church.
You can pray in the corner of your house. In the closet. And that’s what…they believed in.”95
These anti-church sentiments were common among first and second-generation. Delores L.
Garcia remembered growing up in a household with deep resentment towards the Catholic
Church while growing up in Manhattan and the Bronx. Born and raised in New York to
immigrant parents from Spain and France, Garcia described similar negative experiences that
pushed her parents and herself away from the church. She stated that her parents believed in God
but “never went to church except for some wedding or baptism.”96

Nueva Yorkers and Tampeños in the International Brigades
In the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (the American volunteer unit of the Spanish Republican
Army or the XV International Brigade), New Yorkers constituted the largest percentage of
American volunteers, between a fifth and a third were from or had lived in the city before
traveling to Spain. The logistical position of New York as a natural point of departure for Europe
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and the strong anti-fascist movements and recruitment of volunteers in the city contributed to this
fact. Also, the ease of a quick subway ride to the harbor to start their journey to Spain made it
easier for New Yorkers compared to those in the nation’s heartland. However, forty-six of all
forty-eight states were represented among the volunteers. 97
Most of the Spanish speaking members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade came from New
York and Ybor City. In Spain, they joined the most diverse military unit in American history at
the time. However, their motivations were often at odds with their American counterparts, and
they projected the oppression they experienced at home in the conflict. Like all the volunteers,
they received no monetary compensation or guarantee of medical insurance if they were injured.
They joined simply for the opportunity to fight fascism, even if it meant putting themselves at
risk of criminal prosecution by the United States government. Before departing New York
Harbor for Europe, they headed to a lower Manhattan Army-Navy for a uniform and equipment.
The store manager lined them up single file and “shoved World War I GI issue,” onto their arms.
“They asked for no money,” for they “had none to offer.”98
Among the international volunteers in Spain, Cuba sent the most from Latin America.
This solidarity among the Cuban and Spanish people translated into the Cuban communities in
the United States.99 In New York, many of the Cuban volunteers were members of the Julio
Mella Club in Harlem. Named after the founder of Cuba’s Communist party, many of the club’s
members were refugees from Fulgencio Batista dictatorship. One of these men and among the
first American volunteers to arrive in Spain, was Rodolfo de Armas y Soto, a Cuban exile, who
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had resided in both Ybor City and New York. A member of the Julio Mella Club, Rodolfo, and
his compatriots often sang anti-Batista songs and talked of Jose Marti at the club in Harlem.
Standing at five foot eight with broad muscular shoulders, he was described as “always serious
and in a hurry,” and seemed “intolerant and angry.” Rodolfo was “the most advanced Marxist of
all the Cubans,” but was considered “the gentlest of human beings” after one got to know him.
For Cubans like Rodolfo, the war in Spain represented an opportunity to fight fascism and their
way of getting back at Batista. They hoped that the defeat of fascism in Europe would inevitably
lead to the downfall of fascism in North and South America. Unfortunately for Rodolfo, a month
after arriving in Spain, he was killed in the Battle of Jarama, alongside many Lincoln volunteers,
before he could see the end of Batista’s regime. 100
Another early arrival and exile living in New York was Cuban intellectual and writer
Pablo de la Torriente Brau. He is regarded to be among the most important Cuban writers of the
20th century. In Spain, he worked as a correspondent for the New York magazine, New Masses,
and the Mexican newspaper El Machete. For Pablo, as a Communist and a revolutionary, the
revolution in Spain represented an “opportunity to live,” and to project the struggle to Cuba. As
he explained in a letter to Adolfo Garcia before departing from New York, “the Cuban revolution
depends on these moments in Spain because there lies the prologue; for if failure occurs there,
we may expect, very soon…the grand definitive crisis in Europe.” After arriving in Spain in
September 1936, he collected testimonies and wrote memorable chronical of the conflict in
Barcelona and Madrid. He soon became a political commissar for the 7th Division before being
killed in action during the siege of Madrid a few weeks later in December.101
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At the end of January 1936, the Lincoln Battalion (part of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade)
had formed with the first 550 volunteers from all over the United States. When the Lincoln’s
underwent training in Villanueva de al Jara, they consisted of men from Cuban, Mexican, Puerto
Rican, African American, Irish and Canadian backgrounds. Naturally, the Spanish speaking
volunteers from the U.S. served as translators for the battalion. Jack Shirai, a Japanese American,
was a notable member among them. Serving as the battalion cook, he distinguished himself not
only for his talent as a chief but also as a machine gunner. He was popular among wounded in
the hospital and the Spanish villagers “who talked often of the Japanese who had come so far for
them.”102 By the time the Lincolns finished training a few weeks later, they emerged as the most
diverse military unit in American history.
However, as Puerto Rican writer Antonio Pacheco Padro wrote, the relationship between
the Hispanic and “Yanquis” volunteers of the Lincoln Battalion was not entirely harmonious.
During training, there were “a series of incidents between” the two groups. He mentioned the
“latinos,” were mainly from New York, which included Cubans, Chileans and Mexicans, some
of which were members of the Spanish Workers Club and Club Chileno. He revealed that an
American from Chicago slapped a drunk Cuban in the canteen. This created a chain reaction that
caused a “storm of slaps between Cubans and Americans.” During the fight, “the Chileans,
Mexicans and Puerto Ricans sided with the boys from Cuba and the incident was about to turn
into mutiny…if it had not been for the diplomatic mediations of the Canadians.” After Jarama,
the “latinos” in his group left the XV Brigade and joined the First Mobile Shock Brigade of El
Campesino.103
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At Jarama, the first battle for the Lincoln Battalion, the untested American unit suffered
heavy losses. Among those killed were two, out of six known, Native Americans volunteers.
Thomas Cox, a Native from Alaska, was a member of the Canadian Communist Party and a
Marine Fireman before departing for Spain. In his late-forties, Cox was among the older
volunteers in the unit. John Parks, a “full-blooded Indian” from Philadelphia, was a Pennsylvania
state organizer for the Unemployed Council and a leading member of the Communist Party of
Eastern Pennsylvania. Although he was 23, Parks was described as looking much older with a
cavity for a chest, stooped shoulders, and deep-set dark eyes with high cheekbones. A victim of
the Great Depression, Parks had aged beyond his years when he arrived in Spain, and his
companion aboard the SS Champlain felt that if he ever smiled, the “creases on his face would
crack.”104
Parks and Cox’s tribal background are unknown; among the other Native Americans in
the XV Brigade, one was part Sioux and another 5th generation Seneca Indian. Parks worked in
textile manufacturing before joining Lincoln’s. Well-read in Marxist-Leninist theories, he was a
natural leader and lectured against the capitalist system. In Spain, he was assigned as a Section
leader and commissar. Lincoln veteran John Tisa recalled one of his passionate speeches, where
he condemned capitalism for “thriving on the destruction of dignity of race and ethnic
minorities…of the American working class.” He dedicated his life to do his “part in replacing
capitalism with a humane system of socialism…where human dignity will flower and cause all
life to flourish.” Parks, Cox, and a dozen others in his unit disappeared in the early morning of
February 27th when their transport truck took a wrong turn into Nationalist lines. Years later,
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Lincoln veteran, Carl Geiser, discovered that they were ambushed and killed by a fascist
patrol.105
The carnage of Jarama did not only produce casualties, it also created leaders. Oliver
Law, whose previous military experience in the US Army and bravery under fire, as the
commander of the Tom Mooney machine Gun Company, distinguished him from the rest. After
the battle, Law was chosen as the next commander of the Lincoln-Washington Battalion, which
were merged together after both units sustained massive casualties. Born in West Texas, he had
served six years as an enlisted man in the Army before joining the Communist Party in Chicago
while working as a stevedore. When an old US Army Colonel, from the Southern United States,
visited the battalion in Spain, he asked Law if he was wearing a “Captain’s uniform?” Law
responded, “Yes, I am, because I am a Captain. In America…I could only rise as high as a
corporal, but here…I can rise according to my worth.” On July 10, 1937, at the Battle of Brunete,
while courageously leading the charge up Mosquito Hill, Law was wounded by a sniper.
Moments later, Law was struck a second time lying on a stretcher as he was being carried back
down. Law told his men shortly before succumbing to his wounds, “I’m finished, go back for the
other wounded. Tell the guys to keep up the good fight.”106 Law was the first African American
to command a fully integrated unit, with white troops, in American history.
In Spain, the efforts of Ybor City to support the Republic were well known. The song,
¡No Pasarán! which was sung loudly throughout the streets of Madrid, was written by a Ybor
cigar maker. Among the 2,800 members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, more than twenty
were from Ybor City. Some, like Aurelio and Eladio Bolanos, were brothers who joined the
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International Brigade together. While others who traveled to Spain to fight fascism did so
knowing they would be fighting their own family. Jose Garcia Granell, known as Pepe, knew he
might have to face his brother in combat when he traveled to New York, with a group of others
from Ybor, to join the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in January 1937.107
Like many who left Spain during the Monarchy, Pepe, his two oldest brothers, and father,
left their native land of Asturias as teenagers to avoid military service in Morocco, leaving
behind the youngest son. In Ybor, they started a new life as workers in the Tobacco industry.
Anthony Granell, Pepe’s nephew, remembers how generous and caring he was towards his
family. Every Friday, “Pepe would come around and give all the Granells’ nephews a quarter. So
that, they remember Pepe.” He was not politically affiliated with any party or union, but he was a
novelist and a proud Spaniard who represented many who return to defend their native land.108
In June 1937, the Mundo Grafico, a Spanish magazine, interviewed Pepe while on leave
in Madrid. He told Spanish readers that, “Ybor is the best representation of Spain in the United
States,” and described in detail the enormous efforts of the Latin community for the Spanish
cause. He mentioned he only had two days leave and was heading back soon to avoid being
punished with trench digging duty since he “preferred the rife rather than the shovel and pick.”
Dreadfully, Pepe revealed that of the eleven men from Ybor City that had served alongside him
in the Lincoln Battalion, “all have fallen dead or wounded.” “On the ground of Spain -loved in
Ybor City- they have found death,” he mourned.109
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A few months later, during the retreat of the Republican Army in the Siege of Gandesa,
Pepe was captured by Francoist forces. He spent eighteen months as a prisoner of war. Pepe did
eventually meet his youngest brother Oscar, who had been a Nationalist soldier in the war.
However, instead of killing each other, as he feared, Oscar managed to rescue him from the
prisoner of war camp. Years later, their nephew recollected, “if his brother wouldn’t have done
that, they would have killed Pepe,” even as a prisoner, he was always “very outspoken…very
devoted for his cause.” However, Pepe did not make it back home to Tampa. While in hiding,
“he was injured, he died and was buried in Spain.”110

110

Anthony Granell Interview.

42

CHAPTER 2.
THE MEXICAN WORKING-CLASS IN CALIFORNIA AND THE SPANISH CIVIL
WAR

In California, the news of the Nationalist revolt in Spain arrived during a time of great
labor unrest across numerous industrial sectors up and down the Pacific Coast. The economic
devastation created in the wake of the Great Depression sparked a wave of labor militancy on a
scale unseen in the state’s history. During the 1930s, workers in the agricultural fields, the
canneries, ship docks, garment manufacturing plants, furniture shops, and other industries, were
actively engaged in widespread labor strikes. They formed multi-ethnic labor unions that
represented large numbers of Mexican, Filipino, Chinese, Japanese, Black, and White workers of
both sexes. Simultaneously, workers in California (and Washington, Oregon, and Alaska) were
active in opposing totalitarianism abroad while they fought for improved wages and working
conditions at home.
In Los Angeles and San Francisco, an array of ethnic groups in Popular Front labor
unions affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), such as the International
Longshoremen and Warehouse Union (ILWU); the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and
Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA); the United Furniture Workers (UFW); International
Ladies Garments Workers Union (ILGWU); and the Alaska Cannery Workers Union (ACWU),
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among others, labored together towards a united front at home and towards the growing threat of
fascism abroad. This chapter will explore the role of Mexican-Americans and migrant workers
(from Mexico and the Philippines) in labor organizations during the 1930s and their involvement
in labor militancy and internationalism during the Spanish Civil War.
At the turn of the twentieth century, California’s agricultural economy became
progressively diversified. Large-scale irrigation, land reclamations, and expanding railroad
networks shifted the agricultural industry away from wheat and cereals to sugar beets, fruit, and
vegetables. This made way for the rise of commercial agriculture, new communities, and
consumer markets. Californian growers recruited cheap labor from a series of ethnic groups
beginning in the second half of the 19th century. In order of succession, they included Native
Americans, Chinese, Japanese, European immigrants, Mexican, and Filipinos. However, the
decline of the Native American population, the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, and the
Gentlemen’s Agreements with Japan increased the pull for Mexican labor by the twentieth
century. Crude racial stereotypes of Mexican as peons convinced employers that they were
racially suited for arduous work and low wages. By the 1920s, Mexican workers outnumbered all
other ethnic or racial groups in California’s agricultural industry.111
Although Anglo Americans regarded Mexicans as recent arrivals in the United States,
they have been a part of a well-established community that dates back centuries. Mexicans have
resided in the present-day states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas since the arrival
of the Spanish missions and rancheros in the early colonial period.112 However, the number of
people of Mexican origin increased dramatically at the turn of the twentieth century. Before the
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1930s, there were few legal barriers for Mexican immigrants. The eight-dollar head tax or
required literacy test established by congress in 1917 was largely unenforced on Mexican
migrant workers at the behest of American agricultural and railroad companies seeking cheap
labor. By the 1920s, Mexicans could be found harvesting sugar beets in Minnesota, laying
railroad tracks in Kansas, packing meat in Chicago, mining coal in Oklahoma, assembling cars in
Detroit, and canning fish in Alaska.113
Between 1900 and 1930, over one million Mexican immigrants arrived in the United
States, many due to the economic and political turmoil of the Mexican Revolution. According to
the Mexican Fact-Finding Committee report published in 1930, an estimated 250,000 Mexicans
lived in Los Angeles County in 1928, approximately 11 percent of the total population. The
report also found that the city of Los Angeles—with a Mexican population of 134,300—was
home to “a larger population of Mexicans than any other city in the United States or even
Mexico with the exception of Mexico City.” Limited employment opportunities restricted
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans to unskilled work in the manufacturing, transportation, and
agricultural industry with virtually no opportunity for advancement. Working conditions,
particularly in the railroad industry, which required workers to sleep in railroad cars, were so
strenuous that the Fact-Finding Committee claimed: “white men do not seek such employment
under any condition.”114
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Before the 1930s, the railroad and agricultural industry employed the majority of
Mexicans in California. The arduous working environment of these industries meant that
employers became dependent on Mexican migrants willing to labor under such conditions,
especially during labor shortages in World War I. The demand for migratory labor remained
strong during the post-war economy, and railroad and mining companies joined large growers in
exerting pressure on Congress to permit relatively open Mexican immigration throughout the
1920s. By the end of the decade, Mexican workers became the largest single element in
California’s agricultural labor supply, comprising over 50 percent of migrant workers in the
industry. Employers preferred immigrant labor not only because they were willing to work under
grueling conditions for lower wages, but if they ever attempted to strike, they could be
threatened with deportation (roughly 80 percent were non-citizens) or pitted against other groups
of workers. The common belief that Mexican workers could not be organized did not only make
them vulnerable to employer exploitation but also a target of conservative labor organizations,
such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL). In 1925 the AFL strongly supported the Box
Bill and the Harris Bill that sought to limit Mexican immigration to 1,575 per year.115 The
president of the AFL argued that restrictions on Mexican immigration were necessary to protect
American workers and small farms from adverse competition. However, lobbyists from the
agricultural, railroad and mining industries successfully blocked the passage of the bills by
arguing that Mexican labor was “indispensable” to their industries, and they were “not radical in
the slightest respect” and could be “easily controlled by those in authority.”116
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Before the Great Depression, anti-Mexican immigration bills remained unsuccessful due
to the lobbying efforts of employers. However, it did serve as a warning for growers who
realized that their labor supply was vulnerable to political uncertainty. Therefore, growers began
to subsidize their workforce with Filipino laborers. Since the Philippines Islands were under the
possession of the United States, Filipinos were American nationals (but not citizens) and were
not subject to immigration laws. The first bulk of Filipino immigration came from the sugar cane
plantations of the Hawaiian Islands. Between 1920 and 1930, the Filipino population in the
United States rose from 5,600 to 56,000, most of which remained in the Pacific Coast and
worked on farms and canneries. Approximately 85 percent of them were young men under the
age of thirty, and many were enrolled as students in universities. Growers preferred Filipino
migrants because they did not have established family ties, which allowed them the mobility they
desired. Although Filipino migrant workers were not numerous enough to eclipse Mexican
laborers in the agricultural industry, they did undercut other workers in some areas, notably
Japanese and white workers.117
However, the market collapse in 1929 completely changed the playing field. During the
worst years of the Great Depression—between 1929 and 1932—more than 13 million workers
across the country lost their jobs. Immigrants were no longer the only ones willing to work in the
fields. Massive job losses created a surplus of white labor willing to work under any conditions.
The rise in unemployment caused the demand for Mexican and Filipino labor to drop
significantly, and growers no longer lobbied for leniency towards Mexican migration. In search
of a scapegoat, nativists blamed Mexicans for unemployment and began to call for their removal.
In 1929 Congress passed legislation setting penalties for illegal entry for the first time. The
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following year the U.S. government no longer issued visas for common laborers. This reduced
immigration by 75 percent compared to the previous five years. The U.S. Border Patrol, which
was established in 1925 mainly to enforce customs and prohibition laws, was transformed from
an understaffed and underfunded agency to an effective organization that greatly reduced illegal
immigration.118
Disgracefully, the U.S. government did not stop at immigration reduction. They followed
up with a massive repatriation campaign that lasted till the end of the 1930s. Even though the
vast majority of legal immigration arrived from Europe at the time, Mexicans were the main
target of removal. Between 1929 and 1939, the U.S. government deported an estimated 400,000
to 600,000 people (though other estimations place that number in the millions). Expulsions of
entire families were frequent, and an estimated 63 percent of those deported were birthright
citizens.119 The mass scale removal of hundreds of thousands of people impacted the Mexican
community in the United States for generations. U.S. officials also targeted Filipino immigration
with the passage of the Philippine Islands Independence Act of 1934, which set a quota that
amounted to Filipino exclusion. The Filipino Repatriation Act in 1935 offered free transportation
for Filipinos living in the United States back to their home island if they agreed never to return.
The program had very little success.120
For Mexican immigrants that had lived in the United States for years or even decades,
repatriation was a double edge sword. After years of confronting discrimination and assimilating
to American society, they were faced with the same issue after returning to Mexico. Many had

118

Balderrama & Rodriguez, 149-151.; Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression:
Repatriation Pressures 1929-1939 (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1974), 174.
119
Ibid.
120
Majka and Majka, 72-73.

48

changed during their stay in the United States. Their mode of life, including dress, speech, and
manners had become Americanized. The younger generation born in the United States were
educated in American schools, spoke primarily in English, and identified as American. They
comprised 60 percent of all those deported. For them the trauma of being expelled from the
country of their birth was especially difficult to cope. Among those who survived repatriation
and remained in the United States, they renounced their Mexicanismo and embraced an
American identity. Many began to move out of Mexican neighborhoods and marry outside their
ethnicity. As one young second generation Mexican stated: “I am an American with a dash of
Mexican heritage!” They became more active in asserting their rights as citizens and participated
in labor militancy. In the interwar period, they rejected the U.S. government policy of
isolationism and joined other liberal minded Americans during the Spanish relief movement and
called for the lifting of the embargo on the Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War. 121

California’s Workers Respond to The Spanish Civil War
During the 1920s and 1930s, the Communist Party of the USA (CP) was a driving force
in unionizing Mexican agricultural labor and a catalyst in many union organizations serving
minority groups. Beginning in the 1920s, the Communist Party started a campaign targeting the
unionization of unorganized immigrant workers in the agricultural industry. The CP’s effort was
a response to the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920, which called for
Party branches in advanced capitalist nations to organize large populations of oppressed rural
laborers by using the Bolshevik model. In California’s agricultural industry, the Party targeted
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immigrant workers in areas like Imperial Valley, where fifty-one growers own 83 percent of all
farmland (most of whom were absentee landlords). This campaign marked the Party’s first
comprehensive effort to organize the Mexican-working class on a mass scale.122 By the 1930s,
the Party had built its second-largest statewide presence in California (after New York) with San
Francisco and Los Angeles leading in party membership.123
The CP’s initial strategy was to organize workers that had been ignored by the AFL
under the Trade Union Unity League (TUUL), an industrial union umbrella organization founded
by the Party in 1929. The TUUL played an essential role in organizing Mexican and Filipino
workers into the CP aligned Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWIU, a
mostly Mexican union). Between 1930 and 1934, the CAWIU organized several strikes.
Although their successes were marginal, they shattered all false notions pushed by AFL that
trade unions could not organize immigrants. However, the CP’s efforts ended in failure. After the
failed El Monte strike and the arrest of several union leaders, the CAWIU dissolved in 1934. The
following year the TUUL was also dismantled. The CP retreated from its revolutionary rhetoric
and adopted the Popular Front strategy, which emphasized a broad approach of organizing
workers for various unions affiliated with the CIO (a breakaway organization that originated
from the AFL).124
One of the many obstacles that the CAWIU was unable to surmount was the prejudice
that existed between urban and rural labor that prevented the formation of a united front among
workers across industries. Also, the CAWIU was mainly made up of Mexican field workers
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without outside resources and was isolated from the broader trade union movement outside the
TUUL. However, Mexican workers, who held leadership roles in the CAWIU, forged ahead in
the fight for the recognition of their rights as labors and they joined a much more successful
organizing effort under the CIO. In contrast to the AFL, the CIO’s commitment to unionizing on
an industrial scale, instead of craft lines, facilitated the creation of industry-wide unions that
encompassed a diverse membership. This made way for a rapid increase of Mexican workers in
ethnically integrated trade unions. The recruitment efforts of Mexican-American leaders like
Bert Corona and Luisa Moreno in the CIO also facilitated this growth.125
The remnants of the CAWIU reformed into the Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and
Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA), which was formed in Denver and chartered by the
CIO. The UCAPAWA membership encompassed large numbers of Mexican workers, along with
Filipino, Japanese, Black, Anglo, and other Latin Americans. Their success in attracting Mexican
workers made them the fastest growing union in California by the end of the decade.126 Also, the
union was particularly strong with Mexican and Mexican-American women and was among the
first trade unions to allow them to hold high-level offices. These women, which included
influential leaders like Guatemalan born Luisa Moreno, played an important role in labor
militancy.127
The creation of diverse unions, such as the UCAPAWA and others in the CIO,
demonstrated that a “class-consciousness” was emerging among the American working-class.
According to E.P. Thompsons, this consciousness became a “consciousness of an identity of
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interests as between all these diverse groups of working people and as against the interest of
other classes,” which manifested into “working-class institutions.”128 However, this class
consciousness was not limited to the borders of the United States. During the Spanish Civil War,
the formation of Spanish aid committees across North American and Europe demonstrated a
shared international solidarity expressed towards the Spanish people. 129 Trade unions in the
United States and around the world played an active role in these organizations. The intervention
of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on the side of the Nationalists provided the pro-Republican
aid drives an antifascist focal point with the goal of lifting the arms embargo the western powers
placed on the Spanish government. Eric Smith argues that pro-Loyalists saw the embargo as an
illegal action that infringed on the Spanish governments ability to defend itself, which they
believed was imperative for avoiding a wider conflict and ensuring American security.130
Smith states that organized American aid efforts were not unprecedented. While the
experience of World War I had fostered isolationism in American society, its aftermath also
inspired aid efforts. After the war, Americans responded to the crises when the U.S. government
underwrote massive aid to war torn Europe. American relief also aided Armenia in 1918, Russia
in 1921, and Japan in 1923. While isolationism remained strong in American society during the
interwar period, the effort to aid Spain and the call to lift the U.S. arms embargo demonstrated
the beginning of American internationalism that followed in the post-World War II era.131
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Mexican-Americans in the United States were a part of this internationalist trend. They joined
likeminded citizens across the country in opposing non-interventionist government policies that
they believed endangered national security. In the United States, the main Spanish aid
organizations were Friends of Spanish Democracy, the Communist Party’s American League
Against War and Fascism, the North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy, The
Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish Democracy, the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, and
Labor’s Red Cross.132
Among trade unionist, news reports of the rise of fascism in Europe, the Italian invasion
of Ethiopia, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and the Spanish Civil War were a real concern.
Louis Goldblatt was a witness to these anxieties among the rank-and-file and leadership of the
International Longshoremen and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the CIO. Goldblatt was born in
Brooklyn and raised by Jewish immigrant parents from Russia with a family history of labor
activism. After graduating from UCLA, he moved to San Francisco and started working as a
warehouse worker along the waterfront in the mid-1930s.133 Within a few years, he quickly rose
to the position of Vice-President of ILWU Warehouse Local 6 in 1937. The following year
Goldblatt was elected to serve as the Secretary-Treasurer for California’s branch of the CIO.
While working in the leadership of both organizations, Goldblatt recalled discussions that
occurred within the union concerning global affairs. “While you had all these debates on the
question of industrial unionism, other debates took place on a quite higher level; Hitler, Spanish
Civil War, and so forth,” he said. “This went on both as individuals and as a union; we felt very

mistake. See Jeffrey W. Legro, “Whence American Internationalism,” International Organization 54, 2 (Spring,
2000): 273-274.
132
Ibid., 4-10.

53

keenly that what was going on in Spain, particularly with the help that was being given [to]
Franco by Mussolini and Hitler, these were forerunners of wholesale repression.”134
In California, trade unions played a central role in Spanish aid and other international
efforts.135One of the leading aid organizations was Labor’s Red Cross, which was initiated by the
ILGWU’s flagship office in New York. In Los Angeles, the women of the various districts of the
ILGWU played an important role in organizing the regions trade unions to coordinate fundraisers
for Labor’s Red Cross. In Los Angeles, there were an estimated 150 dress factories that
employed about 3,000 workers. Seventy-five percent of these workers were Mexican females;
the rest were Italians, Russians, Jews, and Anglos. However, prior to 1933 Mexican female
garment workers remained largely unaffiliated with a labor union, much due to the prevailing
belief that they could not be organized. Manufactures took advantage of this and sought to
decrease costs by primarily hiring Mexican women though an open-door system, who were paid
substantially less. 136
However, largely due to the efforts of union organizer Rosa Pesotta, the IGLWU began a
massive campaign aimed at recruiting Mexican women in 1933. These women soon became the
backbone of the union in the West Coast and the driving force behind the Los Angeles Garment
Workers strike of 1933 which effectively shut down the dress industry in the city. In a few years
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the ILGWU had organized the entire industry of Los Angeles and increased their membership to
3,000 by 1936. The fastest growing segment of the ILGWU membership came from Mexican
women, who comprised three-fourths of total members in Los Angeles.137
Nationally, trade unionists raised $20,000 and the Communist Party collected $8,000 for
Labor’s Red Cross within the first two weeks of campaigning. By May 1937, Labor’s Red Cross
had collected more than $125,000 in donated funds nationally, well over their initial goal of
$100,000.138 In California, initial fundraising efforts were very successful across the state. By
September the Communist Party of California reported that they had to raise their Party quota for
Labor’s Red Cross to $1000 after donations from party members quickly surpassed their original
goal of $500. That same week in Hollywood, a gathering of 1000 people raise $1000 for Labor’s
Red Cross during a symposium over “Spain’s Fight for Freedom.”139 After a year, the national
goal had been reached and the ILGWU then renamed their organization Trade Union Relief for
Spain. In August 1937, the ILGWU in San Francisco called a conference to organize a
committee for the cities Trade Union Relief for Spain branch and inform the participating trade
unions that their next national goal was to raise $250,000. This was to cover the construction of a
hospital in Spain and to maintain a refugee camp in France housing 3,000 Spanish children. The
goal was never reached.140
However, the failure to meet the national goal for Trade Union Relief did not reflect the
enthusiastic support shown by union members. Among the most devoted labor union in the
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Pacific Coast to donate to the Labor’s Red Cross and Trade Union Relief for Spain were the
“Alaskeros” of the newly formed Alaska Cannery Workers Union (ACWU). From the early days
of the canned salmon industry in the late 19th century, Alaska canneries depended on immigrant
labor. Most white Americans shunned the seasonal, arduous, and low-paid nature of the canning
industry. The work involved sailing up the Pacific to Alaska during the summer on a cramped
and unsanitary ship to work in isolated salmon canneries. During the fall they returned to work in
seasonal jobs on farm factories in California, Oregon, and Washington. The industry had leaned
on Chinese and Japanese migrant workers in the past. However, Filipino workers became the
backbone of the industry after the Asian Exclusion Acts. Alaska canneries also targeted Mexican
workers. The Alaska Packers Association recruited Latinos by running employment ads in
Hispano America, falsely touting “excellent treatment…and sanitary conditions, aboard the ships
and in the canneries.”141
For decades, Alaskeros were “forced to work from ten to 16 hours a day,” open shop at a
rate of $25 to $40 dollars per month in unsanitary conditions.142 However, after years of
exploitation the Alaskeros formed the Alaska Cannery Workers Union in San Francisco during
the summer of 1933. The union was primarily comprised of Filipino and Mexican cannery
workers, but smaller numbers of Japanese, Chinese, African Americans, Anglos were also
among the membership. During the early days of the union, longtime Alaskeros and founding
members of the ACWU like Adrian Duhagon, Edward Camacho, and Jose Inclan began
recruiting members along the waterfront of San Francisco. By the end of their first year 500
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cannery workers had joined the union. Four years later, that number rose to over 3,000. The
union swiftly set out to chip away at the contractors’ power in the industry. During the 1934
General Strike in San Francisco, six hundred cannery works of the ACWU marched towards the
waterfront to protest Alaska packing companies for employing non-union workers. However,
early unionizing efforts were uneasy and the ACWU defunct for a year in 1935. 143
In March 1936 the ACWU resurfaced and tried to foster an “international” spirit among
the industries cannery workers. In September, the union membership of the ACWU voted to
donated $250 to Labors Red Cross to aid the Spanish People. Demonstrating their militant ethos
and support for labor and civil right issues they also voted to donate $500 to the King-RamseyConnor Defense Fund.144 The next month they collected $560 for the Mooney Defense Fund and
another $250 for Spain.145 The ACWU also condemned the Japanese invasion of China and
ordered a union boycott on all goods from Japan. This fared well among Chinese-American
cannery workers and encouraged further Chinese membership.146 In Alaska, the ACWU sought
to encourage Native Alaskan membership and dissolve the distrust that had existed, before the
union was founded, between the imported workers and the Native Alaskan canners by holding
dances and other community events.147
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The ACWU was initially chartered with the AFL. However, the union’s militant ethos
often disagreed with the conservative AFL. The AFL’s attitude towards the ACWU was
unwelcoming and they even claimed the minority founded union would be unsuccessful
“because of their racial composition.” In search of a better environment, ACWU set their hopes
on the UCAPAW and the CIO. During the regular ACWU member meeting in November 1937
the union voted 40 to 1 to affiliate with the UCAPAW and charter with CIO. “As usual,” during
that same meeting, the ACWU donated $25 to the Committee to Boycott Japanese Goods; $25 to
cannery strike in Petersburg, Alaska; $10 a month to the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade “until [the] civil war is over in Spain.” They also went of record to condemn the
“misrepresentation and betrayal of Japanese labor,” over Japan’s invasion of China.148 Through
the remainder of the war, the ACWU sent delegates to trade union meeting to discuss the war in
Spain and sustained an average donation of $250.00 to the Spanish Loyalists every month.
Other Popular Front labor union that contained large segments of Mexican workers, such
UCAPAWA, United Furniture Workers (UFW), and United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of American (UE) passed resolution in support of the Spanish Republic or contributed
aid.149 In March 1937, the Selby branch of the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelters
Workers (a union with predominantly Mexican-American members. Also known as “Mine
Mill”)150 passed a motion to send a protest to California Senator Hiram Johnson “against the
false neutrality legislation which forbids the democratic Spanish government from purchasing
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arms.”151 A few months later during their annual convention in Denver, Mine Mill voted
unanimously to urge President Roosevelt to lift the embargo against the Spanish Republic. They
also condemned the Nazi intervention in Spain and called fascism an “ugly octopus aiming to
strangle all liberties and democratic rights.”152 That same month in Contra Costa, a county wide
organization was formed to raise funds for Spain. In attendance were representatives from unions
with predominantly Mexican workers such as the Cannery Workers Union, Mine Mill, and
Mexican Honorary Commission of Richmond, among others.153
In April 1939, the inaugural national convention of El Congreso de Pueblos de Habla
Española (the Spanish-Speaking People's Congress) was held in downtown Los Angeles. El
Congreso represented the first coordinated attempt by Mexican and Latinos of all backgrounds to
build a comprehensive and combative fight for labor and civil rights within the nation’s barrios.
Unions in the CIO with substantial Mexican membership, such as UCAPAWA, ILWU, Mine
Mill, UFWA, and UE were the driving force of El Congreso and formed its core. The staff and
members of these unions organized and attended conferences, workshops, community meeting,
and rallies. Women comprised 30 percent of total membership in El Congreso and Latina leaders
held influential positions.154
One of the principle organizers of El Congreso was Luisa Moreno, who cultivated
national interest among multiple Spanish speaking communities during her travels across the
country in the 1930s. Prior to the formation of El Congreso, Luisa had worked to organize
garment workers in New York, agricultural workers in California, tobacco workers in Florida,
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cane workers in Louisiana, cotton pickers and pecan-shellers in Texas, and sugar beet workers in
Colorado. She also worked as an organizer for UCAPAWA shortly after its formation and was
later elected as the union’s vice-president. Later in life, Bert Corona described Moreno as “a
radical” who in addition to her work in labor, “was a staunch supporter of progressive causes
throughout the world, including the struggle of the Republic of Spain against its fascist foes.”
Moreno and others like her in El Congreso (such as organizer and secretary of the congress,
Josefina Fierro, a Mexican born communist with deep roots in Los Angeles), led the convention
to vote in support of the Spanish Republic and to condemn the fascist powers behind the
Nationalist forces of Francisco Franco during the inaugural convention. Another resolution
criticized President Roosevelt’s administration for maintaining an embargo against the Spanish
Republic and for not protesting the German and Italian intervention.155
Various other organizations and societies in California also donated to the Spanish cause.
These included those from the Italian and German-American community, who donated liberally
to aid the Spanish Loyalist and other labor struggles. Among them were the German Workmen’s
Sick and Death Benefit Society, the German Freethinkers, and Freidenker Society of Germanspeaking people. The Anti-Fascist Italian Women’s League also donated aid and held
demonstrations in front of the Italian embassy in San Francisco.156 Farm workers from the
Russian Mutual Aid Society also donated generously to aid drives.157 Irish-American members
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of the Knights of the Red Branch in San Francisco held several mass meetings that raised funds
for Spain and other union concerns.158
Spanish-Americans in California were also involved in pro-Loyalist activities. For
example, the Spanish Masonic Lodge regularly donated aid and the San Francisco based Accion
Democrata Española sponsored several benefit banquets in the city to raise donations for Spain.
These events involved prominent speakers among the Spanish-American community, such as
Mrs. Antonia Nieto and Dr. Cesar Ortega, and leaders from the ACWU.159 The Santa Barbra
branch of the Accion Democrata held several dances and parties to raise aid for Spain, which
raised $60.16 the first month; $129.97 the second; and $308.35 the third.160 During that same
three month stretch, San Francisco as a whole raised a total of $11,350.19 minus expenses.161 In
total, Accion Democrata Española raised nearly $12,000 in aid throughout the war.162 Also,
everyday citizens held leadership positions, such as twenty-three-year-old Spanish-American
house wife Elisa Traspuesto who was elected to serve as treasurer for Contra Costa county’s aid
for Spain organization.163
Also, demonstrations, boycotts, and aid drives to support the Chinese war against the
Japanese invasion were also organized in California. Everyday civilians across the country
refused to buy silk products imported from Japan. Trade unionists affiliated with the AFL and
CIO were ordered to boycott all Japanese goods following a vote during their annual
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conventions.164 The San Francisco Bay council of The Maritime Federation of the Pacific pushed
for a coast wide boycott of handling Japanese goods after maritime workers voted for a Bay area
boycott.165 In Los Angeles, two hundred demonstrators picketed the Japanese consulate and
condemned the Japanese invasion in August 1937. That same day, two delegations from the
Communist Party and Young Communist League paraded through San Francisco’s Chinatown
with banners in Chinese and English declaring “Hands of China,” on their way to picket the
Japanese consulate and present a resolution condemning the war.166 Chinese-Americans were
also active in raising funds to support China’s war effort. In San Francisco, the local branch of
the National Salvation League (NSL) raised $10,000 in aid for the “heroic soldiers of Suiyuan
Province, China,” by January 1937. Across the border, the Mexican branch of the NSL raised
$3,000.167
Many organizers involved in Spanish aid activities, though not all, held leftist political
views that originated from their experiences during the Great Depression. One such individual
was Paula Krotser, a 21 years old living in San Francisco at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil
War. She later professed that her experiences as a witness to the events of the 1934 Waterfront
Strike radicalized her political views and changed the course of her life. “I thought all talk of
class struggle was nonsense. Until the strike,” she recalled. During the strike, Krotser was
studying in art school and working as a waitress at a high-end restaurant near the waterfront that
catered to wealthy patrons. As a first generation American, Krotser’s German parents lived a
quiet life and were not politically active and did not influence her. Instead, Krotser’s political
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awakening originated from her exposure to San Francisco’s elites who frequented the restaurant
she worked in. “These same nice people who were so polite and loving to me would come in and
talk among themselves and to me, saying that the longshoremen ought to be lined up against a
wall and machine-gunned,” she evoked. “I learned that there really was such a thing as class
struggle…and that people needed to organize and defend themselves.”168
Krotser then joined the Communist Party and worked as an organizer, planning events
and fundraisers for various causes. “The biggest accomplishment of that period of my work was
a picnic in Marin County at Paradise Cove with hundreds of people coming and the unions
participating,” she said. “We raised money for…the American League Against War and Fascism.
We were, I suppose what were later called, premature anti-fascists.” She mentioned that
activities in Marin County were “largely confined to education and raising money for the
Spanish cause.” As the war intensified, the collection of medical aid became the top priority for
organizers. “We had some fine money-raising concerts, picnics and activities of that sort in order
to send ambulances and medical supplies over there.” Spanish doctors were members of the elite
and they “hated the International Brigade even more than they hated the republican side,” she
reflected.169
For union members and their families, organizing and attending the various aid events
became a fixture in their lives. Goldblatt described this feeling among union members affiliated
with the CIO at the time. “The cause dinners and cause dances made up a very large part of our
social life,” he said. “I think this was true of everybody on the left. There was always something
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going on [in] support for Loyalist Spain during that period; the constant meeting in support of
Tom Mooney. PW (The Peoples’ World, a Communist newspaper) parties were frequent.”
However, for some trade unionists, Goldblatt mentioned, donating aid was not enough. “Some
close friends of mine on the waterfront decided to go to Spain. One awfully good guy I had been
close to, Jack Egan, he went to Spain; the last they saw of him was when he decided to go after a
tank with a hand grenade in each hand; that was the last of him and the tank.” For maritime
workers on the waterfronts of the United States, the Spanish Civil War held a much more
personal meaning. Not only were maritime workers active in rising aid for the Spanish Loyalist
at home, they also formed a large contingent of American volunteers in Spain.170

The Waterfront Strike of 1934 and the ILWU
During the Spanish Civil War, American longshoremen and maritime workers were
arguably among the most devoted group to support the Spanish Loyalists. At home, maritime
workers donated aid to the Spanish Loyalists; they refused to work on German and Italian ships;
they refused to sail to Nationalists ports in Spain and picketed the German and Italian consuls.
The National Maritime Union passed resolutions condemning the U.S. embargo to Spain and
shut down ports coast wide in protest of German and Italian intervention. Abroad, maritime
workers formed the largest contingent of American volunteers in Spain and earned distinction as
one of the most effective fighting men in combat. Maritime workers commitment to labor
activism and international causes was a direct product of their struggle to organize during the
1920s and 1930s.
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Following the end of World War I, longshoremen on western ports were either
unorganized or in company-controlled unions after a series of failed strikes. In San Francisco,
one of the largest ports on the Pacific Coast at the time, the Riggers and Stevedores Union (R&S)
functioned as one of the most powerful unions in the city at the turn of the century. However, in
1914 employers organized under the Waterfront Employers’ Union (WEU) and successfully put
down the June-July strike that year organized by the R&S. In September 1919 R&S tried again.
However, this time the WEU responded with violence, leading to the death of a striker and the
R&S. In December the WEU entered an agreement with the employer created Longshoremen’s
Association of San Francisco and the Bay District, nicknamed the Blue Book Union after the
blue membership books each longshoreman needed to work. The Longshoremen’s Association
was an entirely company-controlled union with no ties to the International Longshoremen’s
Association (ILA) in New York, the most important longshoremen union in the United States at
the time.171
Open shop became the standard hiring practice during the 1920s despite the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW) efforts to organize longshoremen through their Marine Transport
Workers Union. The Communist Party also attempted to organize maritime workers on the West
Coast through their own union, the Maritime Workers Industrial Union (MWIU), without much
success. Unorganized, longshoremen were forced to grind through the shape-up system and ask
for work every morning. At dawn, workers would line up before the straw bosses, who were
hired private contractors, and hold up their blue books (which they received after paying dues to
the employer run Blue Book Union) and hope to be picked for work that day. Kickbacks to straw
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bosses in exchange for work selection were common. The humiliation of the shape-up
epitomized the rollback of union power that continued after several strikes were violently put
down by the employers throughout 1920s and early 1930s.172
The absence of a union also left maritime workers vulnerable to racial discrimination
from employers. Henry Gaitan, a Mexican-American longshoreman from Local 13 in Los
Angeles, recalled instances of worker exploitation by employers and long arduous shifts he was
forced to endure prior to the unionization of longshoremen in the West Coast. “I’d worked thirty
hours. I was making sixty cents an hour, no overtime,” he reminisced. Gaitan described the
disproportionate difficulty Mexican workers had attaining and retaining employment as
longshoremen in comparison to their white counterparts. “If you had a nice-looking sister, and
liquor, and a wife that would put out, you’d have a job,” he said. Once employed, Mexican
longshoremen faced constant racial discrimination by their employer and were banned from
certain jobs. “I had a lot of trouble because I was one of the first Mexicans to drive a lift,” he
recollected. “At that time the winch drivers had to be Scandinavian or German. As a Mexican,
you weren’t allowed on the winch handles.” Also, employers pit different ethnic groups in
competition against each other in order to force them to work more diligently or fear being fired.
“The company used to hire Italians over here, then a group of Mexicans over here, then a group
of something else, and then they’d say, look, those guys can do better than you guys.”173
During early unionizing efforts, racial tension existed among maritime workers and the
actions of employers fueled the flames further. In the bitter labor wars of 1916 and 1919,
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employers imported hundreds of African-Americans strikebreakers to the waterfront from
Midwestern cities such as New Orleans, Saint Louis, and Kansas City. The presence of black
strikebreakers became a major motif of the conflict and attracted retaliatory attacks from white
strikers. The defeat of the R&S union, which was exclusive to white members, allowed some
African-American maritime workers to keep their jobs after the strikes. Though, only a few were
able to find steady work during the open shop era. The Census Bureau recorded only 57 black
longshoremen in San Francisco and Oakland in 1930 (compared to 3,375 whites). However,
racial equality was pushed towards the forefront by Communist Party members, including those
involved in the formation of the International Longshoremen and Wearhouse Union (ILWU) in
1937, who were determined to end the era of white supremacy. After the formation of the ILWU,
the rate of African-Americans employed as longshoremen and warehouse workers on the Pacific
Coast increased steadily and by 1947 roughly 11,000 out of 50,000 workers were black.174
However, racism towards longshoremen were not confined within the industry. White
supremacist groups also terrorize black and immigrant longshoremen and members of the IWW
along the Los Angeles waterfront. Frank Sundstedt, a longshoreman from Local 13, remembered
“the KKK burning crosses on the hillsides and in front of people’s homes.” Sundstedt recalled
that “a number of longshoremen were taken out by the KKK into the Santa Ana Canyon and
tarred and feathered just for being trade unionists.” Sundstedt sister was hospitalized for burns
and bed ridden for several months after the Klan attacked a social family gathering of IWW
members at a home. “They threw pipes and broke the glass at the doors and came in,” he stated.
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“They went into the kitchen and dumped this hot coffee on my sister…. My sister had to learn to
walk all over again.”175
However, the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 encouraged the
ILA to open local offices in San Francisco and other ports on the West Coast. Section 7(a) of the
Recovery Act granted employees “the right to organize and bargain collectively through the
representatives of their own choosing,” and barred employers from requiring workers to join a
company union or prohibit workers from joining a union of their choice. Longshoremen flocked
to the ILA and discarded their blue books. The Longshoremen’s Association experienced a quick
decline as more workers tor joined the ILA in protest after a series of failed retaliations by the
Matson company, the largest employer on the waterfront, which had fired or banned workers
who joined the ILA.176
The ILA in San Francisco was initially run by a more conservative leadership appointed
by the New York office and they favored a policy of accommodation with the employers.
However, they did not remain in power long and the ILA shifted to a more militant position in
large part due to the influence of the Albion Hall Group (AHG). The AHG, a militant circle of
longshoremen with ties to the communist party, gained momentum through their subversive
newsletter, the Waterfront Worker, which repeatedly pushed for more aggressive action.
Following these calls, longshoremen began initiating slowdowns and other job actions along the
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San Francisco waterfront during the summer of 1933. These actions spread among the workers
as more longshoremen became encouraged by reports of their success. 177
The AHG strategic aim was to establish a democratic union structure with an active
militant presence on the job. Also, the AHG called for ILA officials to be locally elected from
the various docks and serve for no longer than one-year term. This was designed to keep the
union in the hands of the workers and prevent the monopolization of power among few
influential officials with the frequent rotation of leadership. According to historian Bruce Nelson,
the AHG adopted much of the Communist Party’s MWIU’s program while avoiding its sectarian
trappings. The Waterfront Worker’s organizing campaign for the development activist core
groups and essentially informal dock committees were directly influenced by the MWIU.178
Conservatives maintained control of the ILA’s leadership despite the increasing
opposition within the union. Nonetheless, the growing strength of the militant wing of the union
was revealed after a radical program calling for a coastwide contract, union-controlled hiring
hall, and an industry wide waterfront federation was approved during the union convention in
San Francisco in late February 1934. Also, a resolution in support of the Scottsboro Boys and
Tom Mooney and against the loading or unloading of any ship flying the Nazi flag was also
passed. However, after conservative leaders in the ILA bowed to the so called “gentlemen’s
agreement” during negotiations, orchestrated by the Roosevelt-appointed mediation board, the
ILA’s rank and file responded with scalding criticism. The rejection of the deal by union
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members lead to the fall of the conservative leadership within the ILA and set the stage for the
pivotal Waterfront Strike of 1934.179
On May 9th longshoremen all along the West Coast walked off the job. A few days later
sailors joined the strike and teamsters refused to handle scab cargo. Except for Los Angeles, all
major docks along a 2000-mile coast line were completely shut down, including Seattle, Tacoma,
Portland, San Francisco, San Pedro, and San Diego. The strikers demanded a closed shop, a
coastwide contract and a union run hiring hall. Employers refused. Early efforts by the Roosevelt
administration to broker a deal between the strikers and employers failed and the confrontation
quickly deteriorated into violence. Fights broke out between police and strikers on July 3rd after
700 policemen attempted to open the port of San Francisco by force. Two days later, a day
known as “Bloody Thursday,” violence exploded on a scale “reminiscent of World War battles.”
Hand to hand melee erupted along the five-mile waterfront amidst police gun fire and tear gas
bombs. One police officer was reported to have emptied his shotgun directly into the crowd
before drawing his pistol and discharging it as well. The fighting was so intense that Governor
Frank Merriam ordered the mobilization of two thousand national guardsmen to safeguard stateowned property and erect barbed wire near the waterfront. In the end 32 people were shot and
hundreds were injured. Two strikers were killed.180
Ray Salcido, a Mexican immigrant from Chihuahua, was on the waterfront among the
strikers on that fateful day. Before moving to California in the 1920s, Ray had worked in the
mines of Arizona as a teenager and had gained first-hand experience in combating strikebreakers
during the miner strikes. In San Francisco, his uncle helped him get a job in a lumberyard for
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Patton Blinn Lumber Company on the waterfront. He mentioned that his co-workers in the
lumberyard “were mostly Mexicans,” and “they had to work hard there to keep pace.” During the
strike he was involved in combating the strikebreakers. “They wanted to start working, so we got
sticks. Then the police came. We couldn’t run fast enough because there was too many
policemen,” he recalled. He mentioned being with one of the two strikers that were killed that
day. “I was with Dick Parker when he was killed. Him and I was together around the tent where
they had the strike breakers inside. He said, ‘Ray, I’m shot.’ Then I picked him up and got him
out of the tent,” he lamented.181
The next day, thousands of strikers, their families, and sympathizers took part in a funeral
procession down Market Street in memoriam of the dead strikers. The procession galvanized
support for the longshoremen among the citizens of San Francisco and marked the turning point
for the general strike that followed. On July 19, the general strike began with 150,000 workers
across multiple industries in the Bay Area stopped working. The chief of police labeled the strike
as “a dress rehearsal by the Communists towards world revolution,” and arrested several
hundreds of strikers. They also raided the offices of various organizations involved in the
strike.182Among them were the Mexican agricultural workers of the CAWIU who supported the
strike. On July 20, police aided by a group of vigilantes raided the CAWIU headquarters, library,
and school in Sacramento, and arrested eighteen of the leaders on criminal syndicalism
charges.183
The general strike demonstrated the strength of unionized labor and encouraged workers
in unorganized industries to unionize. After three days the strike ended. For longshoremen the
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end of the strike produced most of their demands regarding hours and wages from employers
during arbitration. The demands workers did not win outright were gained through several small
strikes and worker stoppages that followed which included winning over the power of the hiring
halls. By the summer of 1937, members of the ILA in the Pacific Coast held a referendum and
overwhelmingly voted to leave the conservative AFL. Instead, the longshoremen choose to
associate with the CIO, whose programs on industrial unionism, opposition to discrimination,
and support for minimum wage matched their own views. Most locals in the Pacific Coast left
the ILA and founded their own union chartered by the CIO, named the International
Longshoremen’s and Warehouse Union (ILWU), which took firm root among longshoremen and
became one of the nation’s strongest unions.184
The strong Communist influence in the ILWU’s leadership, which included Harry
Bridges (a Communist Party member and the first president of the ILWU), steered the union to
employ African American and Mexican organizers to launch efforts into the racially segmented
warehouse districts, and among the separate clusters of ship-builders, cooks, firemen, fishermen,
machinists, and other waterfront workers along the West Coast port cities. As part of the push
inland in Los Angeles, the ILWU recruited Mexican organizers to expand into the warehouses in
the Mexican barrio. Mexican-American organizers such as Bert Corona and William Trujillo
were instrumental in building up the Mexican membership of ILWU Local 1-26 in Los Angeles.
In April 1938, at the first annual convention of the ILWU, Local 1-26 reported that its
membership had more than doubled in less than a year from 700 to over 1,300 predominantly
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Mexican workers. By the end of the decade the number of membership rose again to over
1,500.185

The Waterfront Goes to War
During the Spanish Civil War, American maritime workers were swift to organize a
response in support of the Spanish Loyalists. The Spanish war came at a time when
longshoremen had already been engaged in struggles against oppression at home and abroad for
years. At home, dock workers had been involved in a series of violent labor strikes against the
oppressive practices of the maritime industry. Simultaneously, the ILA/ILWU had also been
active in organizing demonstrations against Nazi Germany, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. For example, in March 1935 more than 4,000 longshoremen
and maritime workers shut down the San Francisco waterfront in a half hour stoppage to protest
the arrival of the Nazi battle cruiser Karlsurhe. Their action was intended to show San Francisco
Mayor Angelo “Rossi and William Randolph Hearst that the American working class will
tolerate no Hitlers in America.” Some of the protesters in pier 37 were disbursed by police
during the strike to accommodate the welcoming committee that greeted the Nazi naval officers
which included the Mayor and other prominent capitalists in the Bay area.186
However, for American maritime workers the war in Spain held a much more personal
meaning. They were politicized by the ideological currents of the 1930s in ways that other
workers in the United States were not. Longshoreman that worked on large American passenger

185

Chacon, 533.
“Rossi Will Welcome Emissaries of the Butcher Hitler,” Western Worker, March 4, 1935; “S.F. Welcomes Arrival
of German Cruiser Karlsruhe,” The Stanford Daily, March 4, 1935.
186

73

ships that sailed to German ports had contact with Nazified German crew members, who warned
them to “salute when someone said Heil Hitler,” or risk arrest when they sailed to Germany.
Also, during the rank-and-file strikes of 1936 and 1937, which lead to the creation of the
National Maritime Union, Nazi sympathizers comprised a large element of strikebreakers who
kept the vessels sailing during the strikes. When the men returned to the ships, pitch battles
erupted between the strikers and scabs. Joe Stack recalled that when he returned to his vessel on
the Hamburg run, the “out and out Nazis” attacked them with baseball bats, hammers, and other
weapons, sending nineteen men to the infirmary.187
At sea, sailors that worked onboard American ships that sailed to German ports
experienced fascisms first hand. William Gill, an American seaman, was beaten and imprisoned
for several days after whistling the “Internationale” and making derogatory remarks about Hitler
while returning to his ship after a night of drinking in Hamburg. Another American sailor,
Lawrence Simpson, suffered a worse fate. While docked in Hamburg harbor, Simpson was
arrested after “a Nazi agent visited the ship,” the U.S. liner Manhattan, and discovered a letter in
his locker that described Nazism as inferior and called Hitler “a madman.” A German court
convicted Simpson of being a communist and sentence him to hard labor in a concentration
camp. The U.S. State Department refused to respond to the case even though Simpson was
detained on an American ship, which is considered U.S. territory.188 Instead, his fellow union
members were left to protest on their own and take diplomatic action themselves. For example,
in San Francisco, were forty members of the Sailor Union of the Pacific visited German Consul
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August Ponscha and “demanded the release of Lawrence Simpson,” to no avail.189 Seamen held
work stoppages to protest the lack of action from the State Department.190
Simpson’s release came after eighteen months of imprisonment, and thousands of
postcards and resolutions were sent to the German embassy in Washington D.C.191 Maritime
union newspapers highly publicized his case in the United States and contributed to the fuming
tension among maritime workers. This tension boiled over into the raid on the German liner
Bremen docked in New York City harbor in July 1935. In Boston Tea Party style, a group of
American sailors infiltrated the vessel and cut loose the Nazi flag off the bow and hurled it into
the Hudson while the ship was filled with hundreds of people attending a party, which included
members of the Morgan and Rockefeller dynasties, President Roosevelt’s granddaughter, and
Hollywood elites.192
After the outbreak of war in Spain, maritime workers continued the struggle they had
been waging against totalitarianism. Early demonstrations against the Nazi intervention in Spain
were organized on a local level, some of which were put down by police. Such as in San
Francisco, where six maritime workers were arrested, put on trial, and sentenced to 25 days in
prison for picketing the German consulate in January 1937.193 On board ships, crew members
donated money to aid the Spanish Loyalists and the Abraham Lincoln Brigade throughout the
war. On one ship, the S.S. President Pierce, 24 sailors (six of which had Spanish surnames)
donated an average of a dollar each and expressed “solidarity for our union brothers fighting in
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Spain, and the noble cause of democracy which they are so valiantly defending.” They also
claimed to be “fighting for the same principles daily aboard ships and believe that the Fascist
world offensive must be stopped.”194 In June 1937, the National Maritime Union (NMU) fell in
line with their union members and voted to organize the nation’s waterfronts in support of the
Spanish Republic through coordinated demonstrations and aid drives for the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade. The NMU also called for the lifting of the U.S. embargo on the Spanish government.195
These actions by the NWU came in light of the numerous news reports of American maritime
workers who traveled to Europe and volunteered to defend the Spanish Republic in the early
days of the war. Their stories became well known among union members on the waterfronts
through maritime newspapers such as, The Voice of the Federation (published by the Maritime
Federation of the Pacific Coast), which published stories and letters from the American
volunteers in combat or the medical services in Spain regularly.
On the afternoon of August 2nd, 1937, maritime workers on the Pacific Coast
demonstrated their most significant show of solidarity with the Spanish Loyalists. At
approximately 2 p.m., an estimated 30,000 maritime workers of the Maritime Federation of the
Pacific stopped work for half an hour all along the Pacific Coast from San Diego to Canada,
while the remaining 10,000 members of the federation were at sea. The third annual Maritime
Federation Convention organized the strike to “show the world that they protest the invasion of
Spain by Hitler and Mussolini, and prove the solidarity of the maritime workers with the
underground trade unionist in fascist counties.”196 The teamsters also stopped their trucks on the
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waterfront and joined the picket lines on the piers. In San Francisco, 10,000 longshoremen
stopped working while a delegation of a hundred maritime workers picketed the German
consulate and filed a resolution in protest of Nazi intervention in Spain. Members of the AntiFascist Italian Women’s League dressed in black paraded in front of the Italian consulate with a
sign reading: “We mourn the loss of the Spanish children killed by Fascist Italian bombs.”197
During their fourth annual convention on June 17, 1938, the Maritime Federation of the
Pacific Coast passed Resolution No. 65. It stated that the Federation believes “the effect of the
embargo against Spain has been to injure the established people’s government of a friendly
nation, to weaken the authority of international law, to aid fascist insurrection and to assist
foreign aggression by the International Fascist bloc in Spain.” The Federation then declared the
lifting of the embargo to be “essential to the achievement of world peace,” and demanded the
“immediate revocation of the embargo against the duly elected democratic government of the
Republic of Spain.”198 In July, at the annual commemoration of the lives lost during the 1934
Waterfront Strike, vice-president Revels Cayton of District Council No. 2 memorialized the lives
lost on Bloody Thursday along with “those other brothers from the ranks of maritime labor who
have given up their lives that Democracy may live in Spain.”199
In Spain, longshoremen constituted a sizable contingent of the American volunteers of
Abraham Lincoln Brigade (XV International Brigade). Among the thousands of volunteers, two
hundred and fifty maritime workers were recruited from the New York waterfront alone and
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another three hundred from other port cities.200 Among the most notable was Billy Bailey, the
man who ripped the Nazi flag off the German streamliner Bremen while it was docked in New
York Harbor. In Spain, during the Battle of Belchite, he captured a red and yellow fascist banner
and sent it to the Maritime Federation of the Pacific in San Francisco.201
Pacific Coast longshoremen were among the first Americans to arrive in Spain. Initially,
the maritime workers christened the second American battalion, the Tom Mooney Battalion,
named after the militant working-class leader in San Francisco. However, the unit was renamed,
the George Washington Battalion, after the Communist Party in New York claimed the name
was too provocative. But the longshoremen did succeed in naming their machine-gun company,
the Tom Mooney Company. The company became one of the most effective units in the
American brigade. Abraham Neufeldt, a machine-gunner in the Tom Mooney Company and
member of the Alaska Cannery Workers Union, wrote a letter to the ACWU where he mentioned
that his unit had “a very large representation of fighters against fascism from the Maritime
Federation, especially from San Francisco.” He went on to mention that his decision to go to war
did not come lightly. His motivations were well thought through and constructed by his readings
of “Thomas Pain, Ingersoll, Jack London, Debs,” as well as Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and
Joseph Stalin. Also, he described the main motivations of the volunteers were “not only to save
Spanish democracy, but to crush fascism and capitalism,” and “for the establishment of
proletarian democracy.”202
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Hispanic maritime workers were also active in pro-Loyalist activities on the waterfront
and among the volunteers in Spain. In San Francisco, maritime worker and member of the Ship
Scalers Union, Pete Garcia, gave speeches in support of the Spanish Republic during rallies
organized by the S.F. Peninsula branch of the American League Against War and Fascism.203 In
Los Angeles, Mexican-American maritime worker Henry Gaitan claimed that the fishermen that
recruited him into the ILA, Manuel Lopez, “belonged to a Spanish group in Wilmington,” which
was involved in organizing volunteers for “the Abraham Lincoln Brigade that fought in
Spain.”204 ILWU Mexican-American leader Bert Corona recalled going to “forums in support of
Republican Spain, against Hitler, on Latin America, and on defending Jews in Nazi Germany,”
during what he described as his “political education,” in the late 1930s. He mentioned that
various organizations sponsored these forums and that “the Committee in Support of Republican
Spain received support from many ethnic groups,” with the largest support coming from the
Communist Party and Socialist Party.205
Nick Ramirez, a Mexican-American maritime worker, was among those involved in
organizing pro-Loyalists activities in Los Angeles before leaving for Spain and fighting in the
International Brigades. “We were very good friends,” Corona stated. He mentioned that Ramirez
was a “Communist” who was raised by a radical leftist father that named him Nicolas Lenin
Ramirez. Before going to Spain, “Nick had been active in labor struggles in southern California,”
and was on “friendly terms with older radicals such as Ethel Duffy-Turner, Alma Reed, David
Alfaro Siqueiros, and earlier adherents of the cause of Ricardo Flores Magón.” Ramirez did not
join the American volunteers of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, instead he traveled to Spain via
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Mexico and joined the Benito Juarez Brigade, which was comprised of Mexican nationals. After
returning to the United States, Ramirez had a difficult time adjusting back to civilian life. “When
he returned from Spain, he was a very sick person. He tried to work on the docks, but his illness
prevented him from doing so. He later died in northern California,” Corona lamented.206
Hispanic maritime workers from ports outside of California also found their way to
Spain. Such as Edward Pacheco, a Mexican-American who was born in Houston. He served in
the medical services in Spain and was a member of the National Maritime Union. He resided in
Brooklyn and worked on the New York waterfront before departing for Europe in July 1937. In
Spain, Pacheco served in the 45th International Division as an ambulance driver during the
Zaragoza offensive and the Battle of the Ebro.207 Another volunteer, Julius Rodriguez, was a
black Latin from Tampa who worked as a fireman in the west coast and was a member of the
Communist Party.208 His fluency in Spanish elevated him to attend Officers’ Training School in
Spain between May and June 1937. He served as an officer in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and
fought in the Brunete Campaign before leaving the front lines to work as an ambulance driver.
He was among the last Americans to leave Spain and returned to the United States in February
1939. During World War II he worked as a Civilian Defense Worker in the Kaiser Shipyards in
Portland, where he led African-American shipyard workers.209
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CHAPTER 3.
THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN PRESS AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

During the Spanish Civil War, the Mexican-American press in the Southwest stood apart
from their Spanish language counterparts on the East Coast. Unlike the Tampa based La Gaceta
or New York’s La Prensa and La Voz, the Mexican exiled press was much more conservative
and church-oriented. During the Spanish conflict, the Mexican expatriated press overwhelmingly
leaned in favor of the Spanish Nationalists and was critical of Mexico’s involvement in the
Spanish Civil War. The circumstances surrounding the stark difference between the Mexican
exiled press and other Spanish language immigrant publications in the Eastern Seaboard are
derived from the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution of 1910.
In the years leading to the Mexican Revolution, the Mexican expatriated press in the
United States was a liberal institution enmeshed in revolutionary ideas. During the regime of
Mexican President Porfirio Díaz, the open border between the U.S. and Mexico allowed the
revolutionary press to seek refuge in the relative safety of the United States. Liberal writers and
editors that were forced into exile for their opposition to the Díaz regime resettle and published
in the Mexican-American communities north of the border. Between 1885 and 1910, several
Mexican publications were launched in the American Southwest and smuggled into Mexico.
Such publications included Adolfo Carrillo’s La República in San Francisco, General Ignacio
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Martinez’s El Mundo in Brownsville, Paulino Martinez’s El Monitor Democrático in San
Antonio, La Voz de Juarez and El Chinaco in Laredo.210
However, the most prominent and radical publication was Regeneración by Ricardo
Flores Magón. Ricardo Magón, along with his brothers Enrique and Jesus, was among the most
influential figures to create social change in Mexico during the revolutionary movement. In the
United States, Magón founded the Partido Liberal Mexicano (Mexican Liberal Party, PLM),
dedicated to proletarian social justice, and established chapters across the Southwest. Through
their publications in Los Angeles, Regeneración, and Revolución, Magón downplayed
nationalism and emphasized multi-national and ethnic working-class solidarity in the struggle
against capitalism. Their view was that Mexicans were leading the way for the liberation of the
working class in the United States through their fight against political tyranny and capitalism in
Mexico. In Los Angeles, Regeneración publicized rallies and labor conferences under the theme
of Mexican, Mexican-American, and Anglo-American working class.211
The influence of Regeneración echoed in other Mexican expatriated newspapers in the
Southwest, such as La Bandera Roja, El Democrata, El Liberal, and others. Some publications,
like El Obrero (1909), La Voz de la Mujer (1907), and Pluma Roja (1913-1915), not only
articulated the revolutionary cause but also emphasized a greater focus on gender issues and the
emancipation of women. For example, after being expelled from Mexico in 1912 by President
Francisco Madero, Blanca de Moncaleanos founded Pluma Roja in Los Angeles, which
positioned women’s liberation as central to any social change. The paper’s anarchist program
called for the full emancipation of women from three oppressors: the state, religion, and capital.
210
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Moncaleanos was also critical of any man in the revolutionary movement who was not conscious
of their suppression of women. 212
By the 1930s, the revolution was over, and Magón was dead from circumstantial reasons
during his incarceration in an American prison. The Mexican revolutionary press in the
Southwest had dwindled or returned to post-revolutionary Mexico. However, the fall of the Diez
regime did not mark the end of the Mexican origin press in the United States. Between 1900 and
1930, one million Mexicans crossed the border into the United States. Many of these were war
refugees and political exiles from both the Mexican Revolution and the Cristero War that
followed. Among them were Mexican conservatives who had been dislodged by the socialist
revolution and resettled in the United States. They arrived in the Southwest with resources in
hand and opened businesses. The journalists and writers among them established the Mexican
exiled press that replaced their pre-revolutionary counterparts. The two major differences
between the pre and post-revolutionary expatriated newspapers were that the latter was much
more conservative and held a strong sense of nationalism.213
In Texas, the Mexican exiled press rejected the internationalist views of Regeneración
and the ideas of Ricardo Flores Magón in favor of promoting Mexican heritage and championing
la raza Mexicana. However, the sense of nationalism differed between publications on a class
basis. Newspapers such as the Brownsville based El Cronista (1924-1930), El Paso’s La Buena
Prensa (1923), and Houston’s Gaceta Mexicana (1927-1928), favored the Indianism unleashed
by the Mexican Revolution and praised Mexico’s Aztec heritage.214 They became the backbone
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of the immigrant rather than the exile and tailored their message to the rapidly expanding lowerclass economic refugees. Though, many of these publications were short-lived. Other
publications represented the exiled inteligencia from the Mexican upper-class. They represented
a version of Mexican nationalism based on European elitism associated with the Porfirio Diaz
regime. One of the most prominent of these elitist newspapers (as well as the most successful
exile newspaper in Texas) was the San Antonio based La Prensa (1913-1959), founded by
Ignacio E. Lozano.
La Prensa, like other exiled publications in the borderlands, rejected the internationalist
views of Regeneración in favor of Mexican nationalism. However, the Mexicanismo that La
Prensa cultivated was immersed in elitist notions of Spanish cultural heritage. Lozano, who
came from an upper-middle-class background in Northern Mexico, steered La Prensa to
represent the voice of los ricos, the elite upper-class Mexican refugees who settled in the
Southwest. According to Lozano, La Prensa sought to be “absolutely free” of any political
faction and reported on both Mexican and international news. 215
Strategically, Lozano chose to deviate from the conceptual working of the local
community press, which served the long standing San Antonio Mexican-American community.
Instead, he aimed his publication at a wider Spanish readership throughout the Southwest. Each
issue of La Prensa was loaded onto freight cars and distributed by rail to other Southwestern
cities and border communities in Northern Mexico. La Prensa enjoyed wide circulation and
peaked at over 32,000 in 1930, well surpassing its competitor El Imparcial (1917-1921) max
circulation of 9,500. 216 Riding on the success of his San Antonio paper and hoping to capitalize
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on the influx of Mexican immigration to California, Lozano started another publication in Los
Angeles called La Opinion (1926-present). Lozano’s entrepreneurial inclination was correct, and
La Opinion went on to surpass La Prensa, which ceased operation in 1959, and to this day,
remains one of the most widely read Spanish-language newspapers in the United States.
However, despite Lozano’s nonalignment with political parties, his publication reflected
the conservative and anti-revolutionary sentiments of the expelled Mexican elite.217 Also,
Lozano, like other elitists, believed that by giving more land and rights to the working classes,
the revolution had been “the ruin of Mexico, the ruin of industry,” and the cause of massive
poverty. Through La Prensa and La Opinion, the Mexican exiled elites played the role of a
shadow government. In editorials and articles, they criticized, dictated, and proposed policy for
Mexico, while they presented the image of great men in exile and the eventual saviors of
Mexico.218

The Mexican Exile Press on the Spanish Civil War
During the 1930s, La Opinion and La Prensa, along with other conservative publications
in Mexico, repeatedly criticized the domestic and foreign policies of President Lazaro Cardenas,
ranging from agrarian reform to the support of the Spanish Republic.219 During the Spanish Civil
War, Mexico and the Soviet Union were the only countries that supported the democratically
elected government of Spain. Along with political and diplomatic support, Mexico supplied the
Spanish Republic with $2,000,000 in aid and material, including small arms and a few
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aircrafts.220 President Cardenas undertook this action in light of the failure of the NonIntervention Committee to prevent the direct flow of arms, supplies, and thousands of soldiers
from the German and Italian military to the Spanish Nationalists.221 However, Mexican society
over the Spanish Civil War was divisive. Mexico’s working-class and leftwing intellectuals were
supportive of the Spanish Republic, while the conservative elite class and the Catholic Church
favored the Nationalists.222
Pro-Loyalists Mexican workers showed their support through rallies, aid donations,
letters of moral support, and military volunteers who traveled to Spain to defend the Republic.
Workers unions, such as the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM), organized
strikes against Mexican businesses that supported Nationalist General Francisco Franco.223 The
Spanish Republic’s Ambassador to Mexico, Félix Gordón Ordás, confirmed that Mexico’s proRepublican activists came from, “workers and peasants, intellectuals of the left, members of the
PNR… Masons, the Veterans of the Revolution organization, public functionaries supporting
President Cardenas’s policies, and … teachers.”224 Mexico’s rural population who supported the
Republic managed modest efforts but with the deepest sincerity. For example, in the villages of
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Ytztacapa and Teltapa in the state of Hidalgo, residents collected and sent a modest sum of
donations, accompanied by a letter offering a “fraternal salute” to the “noble combatants” of the
Republic.225
On the other side of the political divide, Mexican conservative elites attempted to sway
public opinion against the Spanish Republic through propaganda. One conservative group, the
Grupo Monterrey (founded by business leaders in Monterrey), subsidized the distribution of proNationalist and anti-Cardenista propaganda through pamphlets, newspaper articles, and radio
broadcasts. Another conservative organization, COPARMEX (Confederacion Patronal de la
Republica Mexicana), an employers association, distributed pro-Nationalist pamphlets in
factories floors titled: “Communist Atrocities in Spain,” “Bolshevism: Public Enemy Number
One,” and “Basic Anti-Communist Manuel.”226
In Mexico, liberal newspapers expressed their support of the Spanish Loyalists. For
example, an editorial from the Mexico City newspaper El Popular, argued for the relevance of
the conflict in Spain to the Mexican worker, by comparing the conflict with Mexico’s recent
history. El Popular stated: “In the Spanish latifundium, in the clergy, in capitalism, in the
traitorous military rabble, Mexican workers are seeing a repetition of the Mexican Revolution’s
experience… The Mexican people are witnessing in the Spanish war their civil war of 19101917. Fortunately, during our Revolution, foreign intervention was minimal… Mexican workers
are deeply concerned about the fate of the Spanish workers… Triumph of the Spanish
Revolution will signify a new manner of struggle and progress for the Ibero-American nations; a
step closer for all toward the realization of a better society. Its defeat, however, will be our
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defeat, through a strengthening of fascism and its threat to the democratic countries.” 227 The
Puebla newspaper, El Diario de Puebla, praised the Cardenas government efforts in defending
the Republicans position to the International Community in the League of Nations by stating “In
these chilling moments of international politics, it is well that Mexico persists in pointing out
errors and condemning injustices so that the truth historically sustained by this nation endures in
the world.”228
The two most conservative newspapers in Mexico City, El Excelsior and El Universal,
leaned towards the Spanish Nationalist and took opportunities to criticize the Spain Republic on
issues concerning Mexican politics at that time. For instance, in late January 1938, El Universal
published an editorial on the “collectivist failure” of Catalonia’s industrial and agriculture
economy. Blaming Catalonia’s failed industrial economy on lower worker wages and time
wasted on “useless meetings,” and the failures of Catalonia’s agricultural economy to “the land,
belonging to nobody, nobody works it.” The editorial continued by stating, “order and common
sense” must prevail over “the empty rhetoric of myopic ideologies and opportunistic agitators”
as “a body cannot govern itself without a head.”229 Other conservative newspapers in Mexico,
such as El Provenir in Monterrey, frequently published pro-Nationalist articles that read: “The
Anarchists and the Communist Terror of Red Spain.”230 El Diario de Yucatan newspaper also
treated its readers with similar articles titled: “The Reds are Paying with Their Lives for Their
Terrible Crimes.”231 One conservative newspaper in Veracruz, El Dictamen, went beyond the
usual publication of pro-Franco articles. The owner of the publication, Juan Malpica Silba, was
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discovered to have assisted the Italian consul in Veracruz by photographing airplanes headed to
the Spanish government.232
In the United States, the Spanish language press was also divided on the Spanish Civil
War. The three most prominent Spanish language newspapers in the East Coast, La Gaceta in
Tampa, La Voz, and La Prensa in New York, were pro-Loyalist. During the Spanish Civil War,
no other city outmatched New York’s material and political support for the Spanish Loyalists.
New York housed almost all the headquarters of pro-Loyalist relief aid organizations. The city’s
two Spanish language daily newspaper, La Voz and La Prensa, represented the voice of the
homogeneous “hispano” community in the city, comprised of Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Spaniards,
Mexicans, and other Latin Americans. As we have seen in Chapter 1 of this paper, New York’s
“hispano” community was decisively pro-Loyalists, and their Spanish language press reflected
this and regularly advertised aid drives and fundraising events. In Tampa, the trilingual
publication La Gaceta represented the voice of the Spanish speaking “Latin” community
comprised of working-class immigrants from Cuba, Spain, and Italy. Tampa’s Latinos were also
devotedly pro-Loyalist. La Gaceta regularly published pro-Loyalist articles and advertised
community fundraisers to support the Spanish government.
In the Southwest, Lozano’s La Prensa in San Antonio and La Opinion in Los Angeles
were the two most prominent Spanish language newspapers. In contrast to the Spanish language
press in the Eastern Seaboard, Lozano’s publications did not represent the opinion of the
working class Mexican immigrant and Mexican-American communities in the Southwest who
favored the Spanish Loyalists, see chapter 2. Instead, La Prensa and La Opinion represented the
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conservative voice of the Mexican exiled elite. They sided with Mexican conservative
newspapers in condemning President Lazaro Cardenas’ support of the Spanish government and
leaned in favor of the Spanish Nationalists during the Spanish Civil War. Throughout the
conflict, Lozano’s dual publication reported extensively on the conflict. Consequently, after a
few weeks into the war, the short-lived Spanish-language newspaper in San Diego, Texas, La
Voz, criticized La Prensa over their “grandiose” and “extensive” reporting on a conflict “so
distant” from the everyday concerns of Tejanos. La Voz did not report extensively on the war in
Spain during its one year run in 1936; instead, it focused on local and national news from
Mexico and the United States. 233
However, despite the decision of La Voz to ignore the conflict in Europe, the paper did
briefly express their opinion on the cause of the conflict. Like other Mexican expatriated
newspapers in the Southwest, La Voz squarely blamed the Republic for agitating the Nationalist
uprising into existence. La Voz stated that “the rebellion in Spain...come from the communist
proclamations, which have blinded the proletarian class against the bourgeois...the workers
searching for an equal utopia by force, does nothing but labor towards their ruin.” Other Spanishlanguage newspapers in the Southwest held a more favorable view of the Loyalist, such as El
Heraldo de Brownsville. However, no other Spanish-language publication out circulated La
Prensa and La Opinion in the Southwest.234
La Opinion and La Prensa were not pro-war publications, and they condemned the
foreign intervention on both the Republic and Nationalist side for prolonging the war on several
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occasions.235 However, the publication’s call for peace was often for one that favored the
Nationalists. For instance, in September 1936, an editorial in La Opinion criticized the Cardenas
administration after Mexico rejected the call from the Republic of Uruguay for Pan-American
mediation in the Spanish conflict. La Opinion stated: “The Mexican Foreign Ministry…considers
the mediation of American countries in the Spanish conflict to be an interventionist act and
ignores the recent sending of arms [by Mexico] to the government of President Azaña. Consider
the humanitarian purpose of ending a bloody civil war to be undue intervention, and refrains
from qualifying the ministering of the elements destined to give new impetus to the killing.”236
What La Opinion ignored in the editorial is that the major Latin American governments, such as
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, openly sympathized with the Nationalists, and any mediation
that involved these countries would have been skewed towards Franco.
Both publications often criticized the Cardenas administration for supporting the Spanish
Loyalist politically and militarily. For instance, in June 1937, an editorial in La Opinion
compared Great Britain’s response to the Spanish Civil War with that of Mexico. The editorial
praised the British government over how they handled the war. La Opinion stated when the
conflict erupted, the British “put all its sympathies on the side of the government of Don Manuel
Azaña. But no more than her sympathy, because she never compromises. Shortly after, when the
struggle entered a period of uncertainty, England devised the so-called ‘neutrality pact,’ which
allowed it to escape the cordiality that had been dispensing the men of Valencia,” and still
maintain favorable relations with Germany and Italy. Meanwhile, La Opinion criticized the
Cardenas administration's political support for the Spanish Republic, the sale of weapons, and
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the acceptance of “five hundred children of red soldiers” in Mexico.237 La Opinion argued: “Our
country has no power to say whether the governments of other countries are legitimate or not.
The only thing that corresponds is to deal with the constituted governments, leaving the citizens
of each country the task of qualifying them.”238
During the conflict, reports of the war by La Prensa and La Opinion often leaned in favor
of the Nationalists. For example, during the Battle of Madrid in November 1936, La Prensa
reported biased headlines that read: “A Brilliant Maneuver by the Fascists,” and “The Fascists
Will Make It More Effective.”239 However, biased reports that favored the Nationalists became
more apparent during the bombing of Guernica in April 1937. Between April 27th and 29th,
several newspapers across the United States published the harrowing details of the bombing of
Guernica by the German Luftwaffe. Frontpage headlines read, “Worst Air Raid of Spanish War,”
“Hundreds of Civilians Die In Plane Machine-Gun Fire,” “Historic Basque Town Wiped Out.”240
Even though La Opinion and La Prensa relied on the same war correspondence from the United
Press and the Associated Press, like other American newspapers, their reports on the bombing
during the same period was more subtle with a greater focus on the Nationalist’s advancements.
For example, headlines from La Opinion and La Prensa read: “Eibar, Captured by Mola: Panic
in the city of Bilbao,” “Mola’s Triumphal March: The Basques Abandon their posts,” “The
Army of Mola nears Bilbao: The Basques Flee in Disarray.”241 In comparison, La Prensa in New
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York directly focused their reporting on the bombing of civilians. For example, on April 28th
New York’s La Prensa’s top headline was “Guernica burns; 800 dead: insurgent planes cause
horrific ravages.”242
Early reports of the bombing throughout the press were not comprehensive. However,
after a few days more became known of the attack, and the American English language press
began to print more detailed accounts. For example, three days after the event, the Los Angeles
Times confirmed that the bombardment was carried out by “German planes and aviators” and
published a detailed front-page report with the eye witness accounts, such as the testimony of the
Canon of Valladolid, Alberto Onaindia, who rightfully claimed, “the rebels lied when they said
they were not responsible for the bombardment.” However, Lozano’s newspapers did not report
significant detail on these revelations. For example, on the same day of the Los Angeles Times
report, La Opinion also reported the death of 800 civilians in an aerial attack “a few days
before,” on page two. However, the paper’s account on the bombing was one sentence long and
did not identify who flew the planes or included any eye witness accounts that were already
circulating in the press. In contrast, La Opinion’s front page reported at greater length the
nationalist testimony of events which blamed the bombing on “anarchists,” and quoted Franco’s
invitation to journalists to come and witness the destruction of the “holy city” at the hands of
“the red hordes in the service of the criminal President of the Basque Republic.”243
Much can be interpreted from La Opinion and La Prensa over what they reported, but
more can be said over what they did not. For example, in California, during the 1930s, Mexican
workers played an active role in a variety of pro-Loyalist fundraising activities, see Chapter 2.
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Yet, La Opinion reporting on these events was non-existent. Also, neither publication provided
any significant report over American support for the Loyalists in general or the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade, which the English language press reported extensively. In contrast, the neighboring Los
Angeles Times reported several stories on American volunteers with headlines reading: “More
Americans Killed In Spain,” “Americans Dead in Spain 2,000,” “Americans In Spain Hold
Celebration.”244 However, a few articles on Lozano’s editorial page did discuss the internationals
in Spain. For example, in April 1937, La Opinion published an editorial that discussed
international volunteers in Spain but did not provide comprehensive details over the volunteers'
nationalities. In the article, Pablo Santos Lozano, a staff writer for La Opinion, labeled many of
the internationals as “mercenaries” who fight in Spain for political reasons and only serve to
prolong the conflict. However, he did give credit to those who volunteer in Spain over moral
principles, but he did not identify who he was describing.245
Lozano was a staunched anti-Communist and frequently published a series of editorials
that attacked the ideologies of Socialism, Anarchism, and Communism. One column in La
Prensa’s editorial page, written by Mexican conservative Enrique Valay, tilted, “The
Apocalyptic Beast: Communism,” embraced fascism as a defense against Communism. The
editorial attempted to absolve Italian Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia and
smear the “Bolsheviks” as lying “back-stabbing” murders. Also, Valay claimed: “Fascism is
nothing more than a strong and necessary reaction against communism, which will be transferred
into a true democracy, with a broader understanding of social and economic problems, fascism
will realize the extent of human capabilities, which Marxism will never achieve. Those who
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reject fascism can be compared to those who, shipwrecked, reject a saving table, waiting for a
low.” The editorial went on to attack democracy as well, claiming that “perfect democracy has
never existed, nor will it ever exist, in Mexico, and countries like Mexico, it is nothing more than
a bloody farce. Everything is relative, and within that relativity, fascism is the best medicine to
cure the World of Bolshevik morbidity.” 246
In the same issue of La Prensa, Lozano published an editorial written by an unnamed
staff writer responding favorably to Benito Mussolini’s call for peace during his speech in Milan
on November 1, 1936. La Prensa stated: “This postponement of the destructive contest, which
Mussolini prioritizes as ‘world peace,’ is imperative at this time.” The piece continued by
claiming “ the only way to ward off the phantom of destruction,” is through military strength
“and spiritually with the intense nationalist propaganda of Fascism—or its equivalent,” against
“the advance of communism, and the chaos it brings.”247 The editorial painted Mussolini as a
peacemaker and a guardian against Communism, but did not mention Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia
or intervention in Spain. In another editorial, La Opinion published a flattering column of Adolf
Hitler’s accomplishment in creating a “Solid System” of government. Contributor, Paul C.
Smith, described Hitler as a man of “great intelligence, acute political perception, inexhaustible
energy, who facilitates information he receives and demonstrates a fanatical devotion to his
belief in the superiority of the German race.”248
However, despite La Opinion and La Prensa partiality towards Fascism, the paper did not
embrace it completely. For instance, in one editorial La Prensa stated: “For us, men of the new
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world, possessed by an individualistic personality who have torn the breast of our homeland in
search of freedom, fascism cannot offer any advantages.” The piece continued by elevating
democracy over extremist ideologies, stating “democratic government that, even when imperfect,
remains in the process of consolidating itself, as the culture of our peoples develops.” La Prensa
concluded by warning that democratic people should not close their eyes to the danger of
fascism, instead we should “understand that fascism in Europe has been a reaction against
disorder…that not only threatens to disintegrate nationalities, but also stifles human
freedoms.”249
Regardless of the publication’s rejection of Fascism, during the Spanish Civil War La
Prensa and La Opinion’s editorial page regularly printed opinion pieces written by fascist
sympathizers in Mexico and Nationalist journalists in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. One
frequent contributor to the paper’s editorial page was Mexican conservative writer Alfonso
Junco. Junco, who regularly wrote religious columns for both publications, was a fervent
defender of the Catholic Church and one of Mexico’s staunchest supporter of Francoism and the
Spanish Nationalists. Junco was also one of the staunchest critic of President Cardenas
acceptance of the Spanish exiles after the war. 250 However, Junco’s writing pales in comparison
to another frequent columnist, Falangist writer Manuel Aznar, whose editorials were nothing
more than thinly-veiled Nationalist propaganda aimed at persuading public opinion.
Aznar was a Spanish Nationalist journalist and a regular columnist to La Prensa and La
Opinion’s “Spain Today” column, which provided a Spanish perspective on the war. His
writings were nothing more than pro-Nationalist propaganda. For example, the day after the
249

“El Fascismo en America,” La Prensa, November 18, 1937.
Carlos Sola Ayape, “El Escritor Alfonso Junco: El Perfil Ideologico de un Franquista Mexicano,” En-Claves del
Pensamiento 15 (Enero-Junio, 2014): 171.
250

96

bombing of Guernica, Aznar wrote a flattering column about General Franco for La Opinion. In
the article, Aznar began by asking the question “how many times has General Franco shown us
the extraordinary qualities of his military genius?” and proceeded with a long retelling of
Franco’s military victories without mentioning the substantial support the Nationalists received
from the German and Italian armies.251 Two days later in La Prensa, Aznar wrote an article
aimed at answering the question, which he claimed, “European leftists newspapers,” frequently
asked, “what commitments did General Franco make with Mussolini and Hitler, in exchange for
the sympathy’s that these two European leaders show towards Spain?” According to Aznar,
“neither Italy nor Germany has asked for anything, and, in short, that if something had been
requested, incompatible with the freedom, with integrity, with independence and with the dignity
of Spain, the dialogue would not even have begun [by Franco].” He continued by attempting to
discredit the Nationalists association with “fascism” and instead described the conflict in
celestial terms, a fight between the anti-religious “Communists” and the “spiritual”
Nationalists.252
Several weeks later, Aznar wrote another column for La Opinion titled, “In Spain
Democracy is not fighting Fascism.” Aznar claimed that “democracy does not take part in the
struggle for Spain: if anything, it would be in the ranks of the Nationalists.” Instead, he described
the war as a “fight for the sense of Homeland, Family, Order, Justice, Honor, and Dignity,
against denationalization and against all the fears of anarchy.” He also went on to delegitimize
democratic governments and stated, “I do not believe that there is in all Spain, neither in the
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national nor in the red, who seriously dares to chant to us the excellence of a liberal and
democratic regime, whose mouth is not seen to be bristling with inevitable catastrophes.”253

The Mexican Exiled Press and the Spanish Exiles
During the Great Depression, the United States government's answer to the rise in
unemployment was to undertake a massive repatriation campaign aimed at removing noncitizens from the country. An estimated 400,000 to 600,000 people of Mexican decent were
deported between 1929 and 1939. And an estimated 63 percent were birthright citizens.254 La
Prensa and La Opinion were among the few publications in the United States to provide
comprehensive coverage of the mass deportations of Mexicans. On January 29, 1931, La
Opinion published an extensive article warning its readers about upcoming round-ups of
immigrants and mentioned that lately, “the majority of those deported are Mexican.”255 This
report was so substantial that the Mexican Consul Rafael de la Colina sent copies of La Opinion
to the Mexican Consul General in San Francisco, Mexico’s ambassador in Washington, D.C.,
and Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriors in Mexico City along with letter’s detailing the
impending raid.256
On August 31, 1932, La Opinion provided a one year update on the repatriation campaign
on their editorial page. The paper rejected the U.S. Department of Labor’s claim that 1,600,000
people were repatriated in 1931 as an exaggeration. Instead, La Opinion placed their estimation
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to be around 250,000, noting that “every day, our countrymen return [to the United States] in
increasing numbers.” Also, the paper mentioned that the majority were deported from the
borderland states of Texas, California, New Mexico, and Arizona, with smaller numbers from
mid-western states.257 Though, the paper later reported that Mexican officials estimated that the
true number of repatriated might be higher since not all returnees reported to the Mexican
immigration offices in border cities.258 La Opinion also reported on the standard of living and
economic condition of Mexicans living in the United States during the Great Depression. The
paper mentioned that in 1930, most of the 40,000 immigrants that returned to Mexico did so
voluntarily due to “poverty, lack of work or bad treatment.”259 They mentioned that among the
repatriated, “relatively few returned with some savings.”260
On May 7, l934, La Opinion exclusively reported that the Mexican government had sent
a delegation to the United States to investigate how Mexicans were being repatriated and to
examine the living conditions of Mexicans in California, Texas, and Arizona. The article
mentioned that the Mexican government ordered the investigation after Los Angeles County
officials informed them that 50,000 Mexican migrants were living under difficult circumstances
related to the economic depression.261 During this time, Los Angeles County appeared to be on
the verge of deporting thousands of improvised Mexican immigrants. This spurred the newly
inaugurated Cardenas administration to act and initiate government efforts to facilitate the return
of the repatriated, which included travel assistance and land distribution.262 La Opinion was very
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critical of the Mexican government's repatriation effort and warned that its “one of those things
that must be done well, or not at all,” to ensure that those repatriated do not suffer unnecessary
hardships.263
The Mexican government’s efforts in searching and securing lands for repatriated
Mexican nationals coincided with President Cardenas's decision to granted asylum to thousands
of Spanish refugees who fled the Spanish Civil War. During the war, the Cardenas
administration had provided asylum to a few hundred Spanish children and intellectuals.264
However, after the defeat of the Spanish Republic in April 1939, well over 350,000 men,
women, and children had swelled across the French border into the department of PyrénéesOrientales, outnumbering the native population by two to one. Overwhelmed, French authorities
relocated some of the women and children to whatever shelter they could find before herding the
rest with the men to a sandy wasteland along the Mediterranean shore. Surrounded by barb wire,
the refugees dug ditches in the sand and constructed primitive tents from tree branches, blankets,
and bits of boards from box carts to shelter themselves from the elements in what became known
as Argelès-sur-Mer internment camp.265
Late in life, world-renowned Spanish cellist and bearer of the United States Presidential
Medal of Freedom, Pablo Casals, reflected on his experience after witnessing the horrid
conditions in Argelès-sur-Mer in 1939. He described it as a scene from “Dante’s Inferno” with
tens of thousands of men, women, and children penned behind barbed wire like “animals.” They
lacked shelter, sanitation, medical attention, food, and water. They were confided in the open,
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exposed to the rain and snow. The deplorable conditions attributed to the “scores [that] had
perished from exposure, hunger, and disease.”266
Argelès-sur-Mer was just one of several hastily constructed camps that house the exiles
in France. Mexican minister to the League of Nations, Isidro Fabela, was given the task to
examine the possibility of providing Mexican aid to the refugees and toured several camps in
early February. In his report to President Cardenas, he described the inhuman conditions of
Argelès in detail. He cited the lack of sufficient shelter in the face of constant icy “hurricane
wind” from the Mediterranean Sea had contributed to deaths from exposure every night. “The
feeding in the fields has been insufficient. The first days only bread was distributed to the
newcomers; afterward, but not always, they have been given meat and cereals. But only the
healthy, the strong, the young, those who are able to obtain their ration. The weak, the sick, the
old, did not always have a way to approach their food and that is why so many died of
starvation.”267
The number of refugees housed in French custody varied from source to source. Mexican
consular official Mauricio Fresco counted 300,000, while Fabela reported over 400,000. 268 All
the same, the avalanche of humanity, which the French had feared would come, had arrived at
their southern frontier. Unwillingly becoming host to one of the greatest humanitarian crises of
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the twentieth century. Fear of extremists led French authorities to confine the exiles in the camps
unless they sought to return to Spain or had evidence of being granted asylum from a foreign
embassy. In the early weeks of the exodus, several thousand refugees had returned to Spain,
lured by Franco’s short-lived policy of reconciliation. However, the letters from family members
remaining in Spain received by the exiles, that managed to bypass the censors, reported a
different story. One mother wrote to her son in France, “We await your return with joy… try to
arrive in time for the First Communion of little Juan.” The warning, hidden from the censor, was
obvious to the recipient, for little Juan was an infant. Another wrote, “Come soon. The house is
crowded, for the Garcia’s lost their home and are living with us. But when you arrive you will
find a room with Cousin Jose.” Jose was long dead, killed in reprisal after the Asturias uprising
in 1934.269
Furthermore, Fabela reported a great number of men of considerable prestige who
expressed a strong desire to go to Mexico. “I found in Argeles, Arles and Amélie a good number
of university students…professors from the Faculties of Philosophy and Law of the Universities
of Madrid and Barcelona, doctors, engineers, lawyers who do not want to return to their
country….many mechanics, military out of the Academies, aviators, who also wanted to settle in
our land as soon as possible, not only because our country has declared that it will open its doors,
but because it is the most sympathetic to them from the political point of view.” He also
mentioned the state of urgency. He pointed out that if the refugees stayed in France much longer,
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they ran a “very reasonable risk of being handed over to the rebel Franco when France and
England recognize him as head of a de jure government.”270
Unbeknownst to Fabela, Cardenas had already secretly offered to accept sixty thousand
refugees from the Spanish Republic in 1938, through Mexican Ambassador to Spain, Colonel
Adalberto Tejada. The first offer was kept a secret to avoid affecting the morale of the
Republican Army still active in combat operations. After the Mexican cabinet favorably received
Fabela's report in April, the Mexican government officially announced the acceptance of all
refugees in France. Practical reasons motivated Cardenas' decision to grant asylum to the
Spanish refugees, but also humanitarian considerations. In his fifth government report speech to
congress, Cardenas pointed to the advantages that would benefit Mexico from accepting
prominent intellectuals, professionals, and experienced laborers. He outlined a plan to disperse
the refugees to fluster industrial and agricultural development, Mexico “shall consider utilizing
the distribution of the Republican workers of Spain in areas and conditions that favor the
national economy.”271
Opposition toward the admittance of Spanish exiles arose immediately after the
government announcement. On April 12th, La Union Democratica de Mexico sent Cardenas a
message to protest the admittance of more “Iberos.” They argued the arrival of “Spanish
Militants” would constitute further problems within the politically divided country.272 The
conservative El Universal argued that the country did not want extremists, thieves, and political
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criminals any more than France did. Even pro-Republican supporters during the war were wary
of admitting masses of refugees who they feared would include a disproportion amount of
extreme leftist, revolutionaries, and communists who would disturb the political balance of
Mexico.273 The Excelsior argued, “The Reds…have the intention of transferring into Mexico the
civil war they have lost in Spain.”274 The established Spanish community living in Mexico, who
had celebrated the Nationalist victory, also reacted negatively against the Republican exiles.275
Such a large section of the Mexican press had been hostile towards the Spanish refugees, that
journalist and politician Felix Palavicini argued that Franco’s agents must have infiltrated the
conservative section of the Mexican press. 276
In the United States, La Prensa and La Opinion were also hard critics of President
Cardenas’ decision to allow admission to thousands of Spanish exiles in Mexico. Both
publications attacked the Cardenas administration for welcoming Spaniards at a time when
repatriated Mexicans needed assistance. However, like other conservative newspapers, the true
intention was to take the opportunity to attack President Cardenas. Also, their argument
contradicted earlier statements made concerning Spanish immigrants living in Mexico that sided
with the Nationals. For example, a few days after President Cardenas announced he would accept
an unlimited number of Spanish refugees, an editorial writer for La Opinion and La Prensa
wrote, “when Mexicans have bread for their children and when the country’s citizens abroad are
officially supported and repatriated, then the government can afford itself the luxury of helping,
on the people’s behalf, all the foreign refugees it wished to.” The piece also stated that “the best
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thing” for the refugees should be to “return to their homeland…now that the environment has
calmed down.” The editorial concluded that this harsh approach might be “selfish, but perfectly
human,” and “patriotic.”277
However, this rejection of immigrants was a stark contrast to an earlier argument in
November 1936, where La Prensa condemned a proposal that called for the expulsion of Spanish
nationals residing in Mexico who identified as fascists as “absurd” and “intolerant.” La Prensa
stated: “The majority of Spaniards living in Mexico are laborious, industrious and lawabiding…Many Hispanics have cemented their home among us, creating families that are
already Mexican. They have mixed with us in the flesh and the spirit…Being a Spanish supporter
of the rebellion is no crime.”278 In another editorial, La Prensa made the same argument towards
protecting pro-Nationalist in the established Spanish community in Mexico, stating the President
“is obliged to grant constitutional guarantees to all foreigners, no matter what nationality they
hold.”279
A few weeks later, after the first contingent of exiles arrived in Veracruz, La Opinion and
La Prensa published an editorial that clarified that the arriving Spanish exiles should not be
blamed for being in Mexico. This change of direction was in response to the socialist labor
leader Lombardo Toledano’s attempt to redirect anti-Spanish sentiments towards the longestablished, and conservative, Spanish community in Mexico. La Opinion and La Prensa stated,
“It was a mistake to bring them into the current circumstance, it would be much worse to
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withdraw the hospitality granted, no matter how resentful nationalists are, we expect that Mexico
will keep her essential principles of decency and honor.” Also, the editorial sympathized with the
refugees by comparing them to the Mexican exiles that fled to the United States during the
Mexican Revolution. The piece then redirected their criticism towards those who showed
preference for the Spanish refugees over Mexican nationals in the United States: Lazaro
Cardenas and Narciso Bassols, Mexico’s ambassador to France.280 Another editorial in La
Opinion titled “Down with the Mexicans! Long Live the Spanish!” similarly criticized the
Cardenas administration for displaying a more favorable attitude toward the Spanish exiles than
it did towards the repatriated Mexican nationals. It noted that repatriated Mexicans did not
receive the same fanfare that the exiled Spaniards received when they arrived in Mexico.281
In the end, more than 25,000 refugees resettled in Mexico between 1939 and 1942. The
German occupation of France severed all diplomatic ties between France and Mexico, ending all
efforts to transport the remaining exiles. Instead, thousands were conscripted for forced labor by
the Nazi authorities and deported to Germany to work in factories or concentration camps,
including 7,000 in Mauthausen.282 As time moved along, the exiles slowly assimilated into
Mexican society. Most negative opposition and press coverage gradually cease within the first
few years of their arrival. As more and more exiles settled peacefully, animosity against them
evaporated.
After the end of the Spanish Civil War, the Mexican exiled press in the United States
continued to criticize President Cardenas for having supported the Spanish Republic during the
war. They pressed for normalization of diplomacy towards the Franco regime and the rejection
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of the Spanish Republican government in exile in Mexico City.283 After the outbreak of World
War II and the United States' entrance into the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, La
Prensa and La Opinion’s redirected their attention towards the threat of global war. AntiCommunist and anti-Socialist editorial continued to be published. However, they no longer
presented Hitler and Mussolini in any positive light. Instead, they focused on the Allied war
effort against the Axis powers. On domestic issues, La Prensa and La Opinion continued to
report on matters concerning the Mexican American community during the 1940s, including the
Zoot Suit Riots and Mexican-Americans fighting in World War II.
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CONCLUSION

During the May Day parade in 1938, the first veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade to
return were given the “place of honor” at the head of the march of 50,000 people through New
York City. In September, at the League of Nations in Geneva, the Prime Minister of the Spanish
Republic, Juan Negrin, announced the withdraw of all the international volunteers from Spanish
territory. In vain, he hoped this measure would cause the League to pressure Nazi Germany and
Italy to abide by the non-intervention pact and withdraw their foreign troops as well. The next
month, the remaining 200 Lincolns in Spain represented the United States in the farewell parade
through Barcelona before heading home. Out of the 2,800 volunteers, nearly one third were dead,
and virtually every survivor was wounded at least once. Amidst a shower of flowers and kisses
“La Pasionaria,” Basque Republican politician Dolores Ibarruri, bade the volunteers farewell:
“You can go proudly. You are history. You are legend…when the olive tree of peace blossoms
again, come back,” she declared. For many, this would be the last time they would see Spain.284
In the United States, countless gatherings and rallies honored the returning American
volunteers. The dead were immortalized by journalists, writers, artists, filmmakers, and their
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comrades in the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Ernest Hemingway wrote of them,
“no men entered earth more honorably than those who died in Spain.”285 His book, For Whom
The Bell Tolls, was based on an American volunteer, executed in Gandesa by Fascist troops.
After the survivors returned to the United States, they were labeled as communist subversives
and premature anti-fascist by the U.S. government. Lincoln veterans and supporters of the
Spanish Republic who served in the U.S. military during World War II were tagged and denied
advancement. In the case of Bert Corona, the word of the formal Spanish counsel in Los Angeles
for Francoist Spain, who identified Corona as a “subversive” for his participation in El Congreso,
was enough to derail his military career.286 During the McCarty era, Friends of the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade and Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade were among the first
organizations listed as suspicious organizations by the House Un-American Activates
Committee. Many veterans and sympathizers were blacklisted by the FBI and watched for
decades after the conflict.287 Doctors who volunteered in Spain were stripped of their medical
licenses. Several veterans were put on trial and jailed. Others moved to Mexico in search of
refuge from prosecution.288
In West Tampa and Ybor City, at the end of the war, the purple, red, and gold flag of the
Spanish Republic slowly began to come down from the mutual aid societies. The overwhelming
support for the Republic from the Latin community was a testament to a tradition of fighting
oppression, which began during the Cuban Independence movement in the 1890s. They
continued this fight in the war to come. However, this time as Americans. During World War II,
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the Spanish societies raised the American flag and faced the same fascist dictatorships that had
invaded Spain. The day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Centro Asturiano called its
“8000 members to pledge all resources to the service of the United States in the war emergency.”
They declared themselves to be a “100 percent American organization,” and called on the Latin
citizens of Tampa to “stand united with all our fellow citizens.”289
However, the plight of the 500,000 Spanish exiles housed in French internment camps
continued to concern those among the Latin community, especially those with family among
them. The Comité Popular Democrático de Tampa moved its focus towards aiding the refugees.
They raised over $50,000 in funds for resettlements and material donations and remained
operational until 1970. However, as Aida Azpeitia recalled, after the fascist victory, the Latin
community “were so defeated and disappointed,” that it became harder “to collect anything after
the war is over.”290 By the time of Franco’s death in 1975, most of the original supporters in
West Tampa and Ybor City had either died or moved away, and the once vibrant Latin
community had succumbed to modern urban life. But the feeling among those who remained
“still ran high,” according to the former president of the Comité Popular Jose Martinez. Decades
later, he was still bitter about the outcome of the war, “[Spain] was a free country changed to a
slave state…they’ve been enslaved for 36 years, and who can forgive such a sin?”291
In New York, the news of Franco’s death was well received. Saturday Night Live
comedian Chevy Chase ran a recurring skit on “weekend update” reminding viewers the
“Generalissimo Francisco Franco is still dead!” Pocking fun at American Presidents Richard
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Nixon and Gerald Ford, and Henry Kissinger, who considered him “a loyal friend and ally” of
the United States while a picture of Franco and Adolf Hitler standing together and giving the
Nazi salute, ran on the screen. The skit continued well until 1976, losing none of its comedic
potency. It was appropriate that a New York show reminded the country of Fascist Spain’s true
colors, which had come to be considered an ally by the United States government during the
Cold War.292
In New York, the fate of the Spanish Republic mattered to more people than in any other
city outside of Europe, and New Yorkers remained involved for decades after Franco’s victory.
New York City was home to the largest group of American volunteers in Spain, around 600, and
the headquarters of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. However, while the cause of
the Republic united New York leftists of every orientation, the conduct of the war divided them
afterward. Many who had supported the Spanish Republic followed intellectuals such as George
Orwell and other anti-Stalinists, including Lincoln veterans like William Herrick, and denounced
the Communist Party and the Soviet dictatorship for the suppression of left-wing parties and
militias in Spain.293 The Communist Party’s shift to a pacifist stance towards Nazi Germany after
the announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Soviet invasion of Poland further
weakened the credibility of the Party in the United States. The wave of mass resignations that
followed illuminated significant commitment towards antifascism and Spain’s cause.294 Finally,
the horrific revelation of Joseph Stalin’s Great Purge by Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev’s
speech in 1956 struck a devastating blow to the Communist Party in the United States already
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under stress by McCarthyism. By the end of the 1950s the CPUSA was reduced to roughly 3,000
members nationally.295
However, demonstrations against Francoist Spain continued well into World War II and
through the Cold War. Leftist publications in New York persisted in calling for action in Spain
for years. One such publication was Liberación, a weekly journal founded in 1946 by Puerto
Rican Lincoln veteran Aurelio Perez, with a masthead that called for the “liberty of Spain, Puerto
Rico, and other oppressed countries.”296 Another was España Libre, a New York based
newspaper founded by Spanish exile and intellectual Marí Ibáñez. España Libre was circulated
throughout the United States, Latin America, and Europe, and was regularly smuggled into Spain
until it ceased publication after the Spanish democratic elections of 1977.297 The New York
based National Maritime Union also pushed for action in Spain and against the normalization of
diplomacy with the Franco regime. During World War II they refused to sail ships to Francoist
Spain “in protest against the appeasement policy towards Butcher Franco.” The NMU went on
record to assert, “Axis stooges such as Franco of Spain and Mannerheim of Finland are no
different than Tojo, Hitler, and Mussolini. To play ball with them is to weaken the war efforts of
the United Nations.”298 Also, Hispanic Merchant Marines like Ralph Cuarón, a MexicanAmerican Communist from California, worked with the Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee in New
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York to smuggle exiled Republican partisans from Europe to the United States onboard NMU
ships.299
In California, the Mexican-American community continued to confront domestic racial
discrimination, the threat of fascism, and express support for the exiled Spanish Republic years
after the end of the war. They maintained an international perspective through El Congreso and
its successor, the Asociación Nacional México-Americana (ANMA). Domestically, El Congreso
and affiliated CIO unions, combated racial discrimination by police towards MexicanAmericans. In one particular case, the ILWU played a main role in building broad base support
for the seventeen Sleepy Lagoon defendants charged with murder in 1942 (later acquitted), a
case that was a precursor to the Zoot Suit Riots. El Congreso and CIO locals, in particular ILWU
Local 29 and UFWA Local 576, worked to suppress and denounce the distribution of
propaganda by La Union Nacional Sinarquista (a fascist anti-Semitic organization in Guanajuato
Mexico that collaborated with the Nazi Party in Germany and the Falange in Spain) and its
newspaper El Sinarquista in the Southwest during World War II.300
In the post war period, ANMA also held an international stance in addition to domestic
civil rights, political, and economic issues affecting the Hispanic community in the United
States. Like El Congreso, ANMA was supported by CIO unions with large Mexican-American
membership such as Mine Mill, the ILWU, the Furniture Workers, and UCAPAWA. During the
1950s, ANMA passed resolutions in support of amnesty for political prisoners who had been
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condemned to be shot in Spain. ANMA also supported labor struggles in several Latin American
countries and condemned the U.S. intervention in Korea and Guatemala.301
The ripples of the Spanish Civil War reached other Hispanic Communities in the United
States not covered in this thesis. For example, symbols of the Spanish Republic were reflected in
the 1938 Pecan Sheller Strike, the largest labor strike in San Antonio’s history. During the strike,
Mexican female workers wore military style hats and clothing reminiscent of the milicianas in
Spain. Also, the movement leader, Emma Tenayuca, was nicknamed “La Pasionaria de Texas”
named after the Basque Republican politician Dolores Ibárruri. The Spanish immigrant
community in New Orleans, smaller than that of Tampa, initiated their local North American
Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy without outside assistance in 1937. The Spanish
community regularly sent checks from small community fundraising events to the Committee’s
New York office.302
In Chicago, the local chapter of El Frente Popular held regular meetings at the University
of Chicago Settlement House to discuss the “the heroic fight of the Spanish people against the
fascist invaders,” and the “liberation of the Spanish-speaking peoples.” The meetings drew large
crowds of people from the Mexican and Spanish community in the city. Chicago’s Frente
Popular organizers sought to encourage the Mexican migrants to assist the Spanish Republic and
facilitated the arrival of Spanish Republican delegates on a fundraising tour. Frente officers, such
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as Nicolas Hernandez, believed that if the Republic lost the war the result would have grave
consequences for Mexican workers in the United States by emboldening the capitalist class.303
In Idaho, the Spanish Civil War proved to be a complicated issue for the immigrant
community of Basque sheepherder. News reports and letters from family members describing the
brutal takeover of Bilbao by the Nationalist forces fueled collective action in the form of
humanitarian aid. However, while many members of the Basque community in Idaho were eager
to help the victims of the conflict, which included their family and friends, they were reluctant to
support the Basque war effort. Attempts by the official delegation of the Basque government to
raise war funds in Boise proved unsuccessful. Most of Idaho’s sheepherders had emigrated
before the spread of nationalism in the Basque country side and were reluctant to throw their
support behind either side of the conflict. Also, anti-Republican press in the United States and
the Catholic Church’s support of the Nationalists worked to shy them away from open support
for the Basque Government in fear of being associated with communism at a time when they
were trying to assimilate into American society. 304
After the war, the Basque Government in exile tried again to raise support from the
Basque community in the American west but found even less enthusiasm among the
sheepherders who were either unaware of unconcern about Franco’s effort to eradicate Basque
culture. The Basque in Idaho did not suffer the tragedies of the war nor experience the
solidification of Basque identify in its aftermath. Instead, they were committed to living in their
new country as Americans and participated in the U.S. war effort in World War II. They
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continued to distance themselves from communism which they claimed “fomented” the Spanish
Civil War and “kept our people in a blood bath for three long years.”305
During World War II Hispanics across the United States mobilized for war. An estimated
400,000 to 500,000 Hispanic Americans joined all three branches of the U.S. military (and the
merchant marines) and fought in every major American battle. At home, hundreds of Hispanic
women joined the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps and Women Accepted for Volunteer
Emergency Service and served as nurses and in administrative positions. Many Hispanic women
challenged traditional gender roles by working jobs in manufacturing plants that produced
munitions and material. At the same time, Mexican-Americans across the nation continued to
fight against discrimination and demand recognition as Americans. In war, they demonstrated
their loyalty to the United States and challenged all notions of being foreigners. After their
return, they persevered in demanding their right to equality and dismantled racial barriers for
decades to come.306
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